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1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1979, the legal system of the People's Republic of China
(PRC or China) did not provide any mechanism for foreign investment
in China. In fact, the 1978 Constitution seemed expressly to preclude
such foreign investment insofar as it described the PRC as "a socialist
state of the dictatorship of the proletariat"1 in which the means of pro-
duction were under "[s]ocialist ownership by the whole people and so-
cialist collective ownership by the working people."2 This situation
changed July 1, 1979, when the Fifth National People's Congress
adopted the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment' (JV Law). The JV Law, corn-
* J.D., 1988, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1984, University of
Michigan.
' The Constitution of the People's Republic of China art. 1, adopted by The First
Session of the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China,
March 5, 1978, reprinted and translated in 1 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2 (Kingsway International Publications Ltd. 1982)
[hereinafter P.R.C. Const.]. See also O.D. Nee, Jr., The Forms of Foreign Investment
in China, in 1 COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND TRADE LAWS: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA Bk. 3, at 1, 2 (1987) [hereinafter Nee 1].
z P.R.C. Const., supra note 1, art. 5. See also Nee 1, supra note 1, at 2.
8 The Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, adopted by The Second Session of the Fifth National People's
Congress, July 1, 1979 promulgated July 8, 1979, [hereinafter JV Law], reprinted
and translated in CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS 7,801 (CCH Australia Ltd.
1987) [hereinafter CHINA L. FOR. BUS.].
Additionally, in 1982 the Chinese government amended the Chinese Constitution
in order to provide explicit constitutional protection to foreign direct investment in gen-
eral, and equity joint venture investment in particular. See The Constitution of the
People's Republic of China, art. 18, adopted by The Fifth Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress, Dec. 4, 1982, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus.
5,301. The amendment states as follows:
The People's Republic of China permits foreign enterprises, other foreign
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monly viewed as no more than enabling legislation,4 briefly set out in
fifteen articles the rules governing the existence of equity joint ventures
in the PRO.
The JV Law was enthusiastically greeted by foreign investors
worldwide, because it was initially perceived as being the key to gain-
ing access to China's vast natural and human resources, as well as to its
immense consumer market.' When the anticipated flood of foreign in-
vestment failed to materialize,' however, it soon became apparent that
economic organizations and individual foreigners to invest in China and to
enter into various forms of economic co-operation with Chinese enterprises
and other economic organizations in accordance with the law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. All foreign enterprises and other foreign eco-
nomic organizations in China, as well as joint ventures with Chinese and
foreign investment located in China, shall abide by the law of the People's
Republic of China. Their lawful rights and interests are protected by the
law of the People's Republic of China.
This amendment was intended to allay the fears of foreign investors who believed that
without such constitutional protection, the JV Law and the joint ventures established
under it could be declared unconstitutional under the 1978 Constitution. See Cohen &
Valentine, Foreign Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China: Progress,
Problems, and Proposals, 1 J. CHINESE L. 161, 168 (1987).
A joint venture possesses three distinctive characteristics, namely, pooled assets,
shared profits and losses, and joint management. See Jaslow, Practical Considerations
in Drafting a Joint Venture Agreement with China, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 209, 209 n.3
(1983); Klingenberg & Pattison, Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: The
New Legal Environment, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 807, 813 (1979); Rich,Joint Ventures in
China: The Legal Challenge, 15 INT'L LAW. 183, 194 (1981). Moreover, a joint ven-
ture will generally differ from other forms of business associations insofar as it has
equity interests by all the joint venture participants, shared control through a common
board of directors, shared utilization of the resources of the joint venture participants, a
specific and stated purpose, executive officers who are directly employed by the joint
venture entity, and a legal relationship among the joint venturers created and governed
by the host country's company or joint venture law. See Swindler, The New Legal
Framework for Joint Ventures in China: Guidelines for Investors, 16 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1005, 1017 (1984).
' See Cohen, Huang & Nee, China's New Joint Venture Law, in A NEW LooK
AT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 195, 197 (H. Holtzmann & W.
Surrey eds. 1979); Brunsvold & Battle, The Prospects of Joint Ventures in China, 79
PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 3, 6 (1981); Hsia & Haun, China's Joint Venture Law:
Part I, 1 CHINA L. REP. 5, 10 (1980). The JV Law merely provided the statutory
foundation upon which the establishment of joint ventures within the PRC could be
based. The task of refining and developing a comprehensive body of law to govern the
existence of joint ventures in the PRC was left to subsequent legislative efforts. See
Alford & Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of China's Emerging
Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 56,
71-72 (1981).
See Fenwick, Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: An As-
sessment of the First Five Years, 40 Bus. LAW. 839, 839 (1985). Following the pro-
mulgation of the JV Law, thousands of foreign firms flocked to China to investigate the
feasibility of joint venture participation. See Moser, Foreign Investment in China: The
Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 106, 115 (M. Moser ed. 1984).
1 According to Western authorities, between 1979 and 1983 China completed only
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the JV Law, although necessary, was not itself sufficient to bring a
significant quantity of foreign investment to the PRC. Chief among the
numerous complaints voiced by potential investors concerning their re-
luctance to engage in joint ventures in the PRC was the vagueness of
the JV Law' and the lack of any other clearly defined legal framework
to govern such investment.' In an effort to recapture some of the for-
eign investment community's initial enthusiasm for the equity joint ven-
ture in the PRC, the Chinese government embarked on an aggressive
legislation program designed to close the numerous gaps left by the JV
Law. During the period 1979-1982, the Chinese government promul-
gated over twenty laws directly relating to foreign investment in the
PRC, and over sixty laws and regulations indirectly dealing with for-
eign investment in the PRC were implemented.'
89 joint venture contracts. See Brady & Stepanek, Eggs for Steel, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct., 1983, at 34; Brehm, Flex Trade, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct., 1983, at 25;
Chiang, What Works and What Doesn't, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct., 1983, at 28;
Swindler, supra note 3, at 1007 n.10. Chinese authorities, however, were slightly more
positive on this subject, asserting that 112 joint ventures involving foreign investment of
U.S.$260 million were established in the PRC as of September, 1983. See Moser,
supra note 5, at 115.
Such statistical discrepancies concerning joint ventures are common. Much of those
discrepancies, however, may be attributable to the inconsistent use of terminology. See
Swindler, supra note 3, at 1007 n.10.
7 See, e.g., Jaslow, supra note 3, at 209; Swindler, supra note 3, at 1023; Note,
China's New Joint Venture Law: Analysis and Economic Overview, 4 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 115, 116 (1981); Birenbaum & Alford, China's Law on Joint Ventures
- The First Year in Review, Nat'l L. J., July 21, 1980, at 26; Birenbaum, Doing
Business With China, Wall St. J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 6, col. 4. For several reasons,
however, the vagueness of the JV Law may have been intentional. First, the Chinese
government may have thought it preferable to provide refined rules and regulations in
subsequent legislation rather than burden the JV Law with such details. See Hsia &
Haun, supra note 4, at 6; Swindler, supra note 3, at 1025; INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, 12 (1982) [hereinafter JV REPORT]. Second, the Chinese may have intended
that such detailed terms "be spelled out by the parties in their contract association." Id.
See also Swindler, supra note 3, at 1025 n.128. Third, such vagueness may have been
intended to be used as a tool with which the Chinese could maintain firm control over
joint venture activities. See Golden, People's Republic of China - 1983 Joint Venture
Implementing Regulations - The Supplement of Detail, in an Attempt to Attract For-
eign Investment, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389, 390 n.4 (1985). Finally, commen-
tators have most often suggested that this type of legislation was so foreign to the Chi-
nese drafters that they simply did not know what to include and exclude from the JV
Law, and thus had no alternative but to formulate a vague and flexible statute. Id. See
also Fenwick, supra note 5, at 844; Hsia & Haun, supra note 4, at 6; Swindler, supra
note 3, at 1025.
' See O.D. Nee, Jr., The Forms of Foreign Investment in China, in 1 COMMER-
CIAL BUSINESS AND TRADE LAWS: PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Bk. 3, at 1, 4
(1985) [hereinafter Nee 2]. China's lack of a comprehensive legal framework within
which a joint venture could operate only served to compound foreign investors' misgiv-
ings concerning the JV Law's ambiguities. See also Hsia & Haun, supra note 4, at 6.
9 See Moser, supra note 5, at 106. Additionally, the Standing Committee of the
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The most significant regulations governing joint venture invest-
ment did not come into effect until 1983. The Regulations for the Im-
plementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (JV Regulations),
promulgated by the State Council on September 20, 1983,10 provided
detailed rules governing the organization, registration, capitalization,
management, taxation, labor relations, and liquidation of equity joint
ventures in the PRC. Because the JV Regulations removed many of the
uncertainties which surrounded the JV Law, and thereby allayed the
fears of many foreign investors, it provided a significant impetus for
joint venture investment in the PRC.1' Nothing illustrates this point
better than the fact that in 1984, almost seven hundred equity joint
ventures were completed in the PRC, 2 a veritable flood relative to the
eighty-nine joint ventures completed in the 1979-1983 period.
By 1986, however, foreign investment in the PRC had dropped
precipitously. x3 This sharp decrease in foreign investment is attributa-
ble to the widespread recognition that significant difficulties still
abound for the foreign joint venture investor in China." Despite efforts
by the Chinese government to address these difficulties through new
legislation, most notably through the State Council Regulations con-
cerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment (EFI Regulations)1" and
National People's Congress validated on November 29, 1979 over 1,500 laws, regula-
tions, and directives issued prior to 1957, many of which are relevant to joint ventures.
See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 74; Beijing Rev., Nov. 9, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of
China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by The
State Council, Sept. 20, 1983, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 7,911
[hereinafter JV Regulations].
" See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Incoming Telegram 1 (Sept. 8, 1983), cited in
Golden, supra note 7, at 406 n.73 [hereinafter Incoming Telegram 1] (stating that the
JV Regulations should constitute a significant force in encouraging foreign participa-
tion in joint ventures because the purpose of the JV Regulations was to "flesh out" the
JV Law and to address many of the more serious difficulties confronting joint ventures
under the JV Law). See also Beijing Rev., Nov. 9, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
12 See Nee 2, supra note 8, at 4.
13 See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 183 (foreign investment contracted for
in 1986 was half the 1985 level); Kraar, The China Bubble Bursts, FORTUNE, July 6,
1987, at 86 (new commitments fell 48% in 1986); Yuqing, Like Bamboo Shoots After a
Rain: Exploiting the Chinese Law and New Regulations on Sino-foreign Joint Ven-
tures, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 59, 99 (1987) (citing Sullivan, The Investment Cli-
mate, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb., 1987, at 8) (foreign investment in China fell 42%
during the first nine months of 1986); Foreign Investment in China: Blowing Cold,
ECON., Apr. 18, 1987, at 69 (foreign investment declined 40% during 1986);
"I See Kraar, supra note 13, at 86; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 99; Schiffman,
Chinese Regulations Seek to Mollify Foreign Investors, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 1986, at
12, col. 1.
15 State Council Regulations concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
promulgated by The State Council, Oct. 11, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA
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related laws, 6 the difficulties persist and have prevented the joint ven-
L. FOR. Bus. 16,701 [hereinafter EFI Regulations].
The EFI Regulations are intended to benefit all foreign investment enterprises
(defined in art. 2 as "Sino-foreign joint equity enterprises, Sino-foreign co-operative
enterprises and enterprises with sole foreign investment"), but most of the EFI Regula-
tions' advantages accrue to "exporting enterprises" and "technologically advanced en-
terprises." According to article 2, exporting enterprises are "manufacturing enterprises
whose products are primarily exported and which have a foreign exchange surplus
after deducting from their total annual foreign exchange income their annual opera-
tional foreign exchange expenditure and the foreign exchange required to remit divi-
dends earned by foreign investors." Article 2 defines technologically advanced enter-
prises as "manufacturing enterprises in which a foreign investor provides advanced
technology to develop new products or upgrade products, increasing exports and gener-
ation of foreign exchange or replacing imports." Whether a foreign investment enter-
prise qualifies as an exporting enterprise or a technologically advanced enterprise is,
according to article 18, to be "determined and certified by the foreign economic rela-
tions and trade authorities (MOFERT) and relevant departments of the locality in
which the enterprise is situated on the basis of the enterprise contract." For an expla-
nation of MOFERT, see infra note 31.
" Numerous implementing regulations for the EFI Regulations have been
promulgated by both the national and local authorities. For national legislation, see
Regulations on the Right of Autonomy of Foreign Investment Enterprises in the Hiring
of Personnel and on Employees' Wages, Insurance and Welfare Expenses, issued by
The Ministry of Labor and Personnel, Nov. 10, 1986, reprinted and translated in
CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 15,527 [hereinafter Autonomy Regulations]; Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade Measures for Foreign Investment Enterprises Purchas-
ing Domestic Products for Export to Achieve a Balance of Foreign Exchange Income
and Expenditure, issued by MOFERT, Jan. 20, 1987, reprinted and translated in
CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 16,911 [hereinafter PDP Measures]; Implementing Measures of
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade on the Confirmation and Ex-
amination of Export-oriented Enterprises and Technologically Advanced Enterprises
with Foreign Investment, promulgated by MOFERT, Jan. 27, 1987, reprinted and
translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 16,955; Measures of the Ministry of Finance for
the Implementation of the Preferential Tax Treatment Provisions of the State Council
Regulations concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment, issued by The Ministry
of Finance, Jan. 31, 1987, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 40,701;
Provisional Measures of the People's Bank of China on Foreign Exchange Secured
Renminbi Loans for Foreign Investment Enterprises, promulgated by The People's
Bank of China, Nov. 26, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus.
10,719; Measures of the Customs of the People's Republic of China for the Control of
the Import of Materials and Parts Required by Foreign Investment Enterprises for the
Fulfillment of Export Contracts, promulgated by The General Administration of Cus-
toms, Nov. 24, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 63, 175; Im-
plementing Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade con-
cerning Application for Import and Export Licenses by Foreign Investment
Enterprises, promulgated by MOFERT, Jan. 24, 1987, reprinted and translated in
CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 64,327; Measures on Import Substitution concerning Sino-foreign
Joint Equity Enterprises and Sino-foreign Co-operative Enterprises, approved by The
State Council and promulgated by The State Planning Commission, Oct. 19, 1987,
reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 63,307 [hereinafter IS Measures];
Measures for the Control of Mechanical and Electrical Import Substitution Products of
Sino-foreign Joint Equity and Sino-foreign Co-operative Enterprises, approved by The
State Council and promulgated by The State Economic Commission, Oct. 31, 1987,
reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 63,341 [hereinafter MEIS
measures].
For local legislation implementing the EFI Regulations, see Several Regulations of
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ture from becoming the significant investment force hoped for by both
foreign investors and the Chinese government. Problems are complex
and derived from many sources: legal, political, social, and economic.
This Comment examines the most serious of these problems, focusing
primarily on the legal aspects of joint ventures in the PRC. Section 2
describes the legal status of the joint venture under current Chinese
law. Section 3 analyzes the procedures necessary for establishment of a
joint venture in China, paying particular attention to the difficulties in
the approval process and capitalization of the joint venture. Section 4
discusses the management and operational problems confronting joint
ventures in China. Section 5 analyzes the most prevalent problem
plaguing joint venture operations in China, the foreign exchange crisis.
Beijing Municipal People's Government on the Implementation of the State Council
Regulations concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment, issued by The Beijing
Municipal People's Government, Oct. 11, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L.
FOR. Bus. 16,741; Regulations of Liaoning Provincial People's Government for the
Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated by The Liaoning Provincial Peo-
ple's Government, Oct. 17, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus.
16,757; Regulations of Anshan Municipal People's Government, Nov. 7, 1986, re-
printed and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 16,787; Regulations of the Shenyang
Municipal People's Government for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
promulgated by The Shenyang Municipal People's Government, Feb. 7, 1987, re-
printed and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 16,773; Implementing Measures of
The Qingdao Municipal People's Government for the Implementation of the State
Council Regulations concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated
by The Qingdao Municipal People's Government, Oct. 16, 1986, reprinted and trans-
lated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 97,503; Preferential Measures of the Nantong Municipal
People's Government for Encouragement of Foreign Investment in the Economic and
Technological Development Zone, promulgated by The Nantong Municipal People's
Government, Nov. 6, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 98,503;
Regulations of Shanghai Municipality for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
issued by The Shanghai Municipal People's Government, Oct. 23, 1986, reprinted and
translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 95,991; Implementing Measures of the Guangzhou
Economic and Technological Development Zone for the Encouragement of Foreign In-
vestment, promulgated by The Guangzhou Municipal People's Government, Dec. 15,
1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 92,201; Regulations of Zhuhai
Municipality for the Provision of Further Preferential Terms for Foreign Investors,
promulgated by The Zhuhai Municipal People's Government, Oct. 29, 1986, reprinted
and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 87,301; Supplementary Regulations of the
Shantou Special Economic Zone for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
promulgated by The Shantou Municipal People's Government, Dec. 4, 1986, reprinted
and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 88,201; Measures of the Shenzhen Municipal
People's Government to Implement the Preferential Tax Treatment Policies of the
State Council Regulations Concerning Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promul-
gated by The Shenzhen Municipal People's Government, May 5, 1987, reprinted and
translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 86,217; Implementing Measures of Guangdong
Province for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, promulgated by The
Guangdong Provincial People's Government, Apr. 26, 1987, reprinted and translated
in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 82,321; Several Regulations of the Jiangsu Provincial People's
Government for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment, issued by The Jiangsu Pro-
vincial People's Government, Nov. 11, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L.
FOR. Bus. 16,821.
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Section 6 describes the tax environment for Sino-foreign joint ventures.
Due to the severity and the pervasiveness of these problems, this Com-
ment ultimately concludes in Section 7 that foreign investment in the
PRC through equity joint ventures, though possessing tremendous po-
tential, is presently feasible in only exceptional and narrowly-defined
situations, and that investors would reap greater rewards by engaging
in joint ventures in countries other than the PRC, or by engaging in
other forms of investment17 in the PRC.
2. LEGAL STATUS OF THE JOINT VENTURE
According to both the JV Law and the JV Regulations, equity
joint ventures incorporated and registered in the PRC shall take the
form of a "limited liability company."'" The definition of a limited lia-
bility company is, however, a source of considerable confusion. Inves-
tors must rely solely on legislation existing in the JV Law and the JV
Regulations in order to determine the scope of the limited liability con-
cept, as the PRC has not yet established a Company Law." On the
issue of limited liability, the JV Law states only that the joint venturers
shall share the profits, risks, and losses "in proportion to their contri-
butions to the registered capital,"20 and the JV Regulations state sim-
ply that "[e]ach party to the joint venture is liable to the joint venture
within the limit of the capital subscribed by it."'" These apparently
17 Other forms of foreign investment permitted in the PRC include the contractual
joint venture, joint development, and compensation trade. See generally Nee 2, supra
note 8, at 21-27; Moser, supra note 5, at 109-15. In contractual joint ventures, the
most common form of co-operative investment arrangement, both parties contribute
capital during the investment phase of the contract. In joint development projects, how-
ever, the exploitative phase is funded at the sole risk of the foreign investor. Compensa-
tion trade is a loan transaction where both the initial advance and the subsequent loan
repayments are made in kind. See Moser, supra note 5, at 109-15; Nee 2, supra note
8, at 21-27.
In addition, with the advent in 1986 of the Law of the People's Republic of China
Concerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment, 100% foreign-owned enterprises
are now permitted in the PRC. See the Law of the People's Republic of China Con-
cerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment, adopted by The Fourth Session of
the Sixth National People's Congress, April 11, 1986, reprinted and translated in
CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 16,651 [hereinafter SF1 Law]. See generally Torbert, Wholly
Foreign Owned Enterprises Come of Age, CHINA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1986, at 50.
'a JV Law, supra note 3, art. 4; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 19.
19 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 203.
20 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 4.
21 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 19. Two Chinese commentators, Wang
Jiafu and Su Qing, have stated that in their opinion, "[tihe responsibility which the
limited liability company assumes for the debts of the joint enterprise is limited to its
registered capital. The Chinese and foreign joint ventures do not use their other capital
to bear the risks of the joint venture enterprise." See Jaifu and Qing, A Preliminary
Discussion of the Law on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 3
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unproblematic statements create difficulties whenever the joint venture
must borrow money in excess of the capital subscribed by each party.
In these situations, the Bank of China requires that all loans to joint
ventures be guaranteed by the parent companies or be secured by some
collateral interest.22 Since the PRO has no mortgage law (outside the
Special Economic Zones) or other laws permitting the creation of se-
curity interests, the parent shareholders are effectively forced to guar-
antee any loans made to the joint venture company.23 Therefore, the
limited liability of the joint venture's parents may be, in practice, illu-
sory, or at least very far from that which is typical of traditional West-
ern corporate forms.
An additional problem concerning the concept of limited liability is
that the limitation is restricted to third parties that deal with the joint
venture. Any liability between the joint venture participants that may
arise from contractual obligations to one another, however, is not lim-
ited. 4 Therefore, because the foreign investor typically assumes a wide
range of obligations within the joint venture contract,2 5 the foreign in-
vestor may incur liability to the Chinese party far in excess of its capi-
tal contribution if it is adjudged to have failed to satisfy its contractual
duties.
The JV Regulations determine the legal status of equity joint ven-
tures in the PRC insofar as they state that such joint ventures are
"Chinese legal persons. ' 26 The JV Regulations provide further that, as
"Chinese legal persons," equity joint ventures are "subject to the juris-
diction and protection of Chinese law."27 The dominion of Chinese law
over the joint venture is also reinforced by the Foreign Economic Con-
tract Law (FECL), which eliminates any contractual choice of law
flexibility insofar as it provides that "contracts for Chinese-foreign eq-
uity joint ventures ... to be performed within the territory of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China are subject to the law of the People's Republic
FAXUE YANJIU [STUDIES IN LAW] 23 (1979)(cited in Hsia & Haun, infra note 40, at
69 n.60).
22 See Nee 2, supra note 8, at 8.
23 Id.
24 See Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China, arts.
16-25, adopted by The Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National
People's Congress, March 21, 1985, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus.
6,651 (Performance of Contracts and Liabilities for Breach of Contract) [hereinafter
FECL]. See also Nee 1, supra note 1, at 7.
2' These obligations are broad and are applicable to the foreign investor in areas
such as transfer of technology, training of management personnel, and arranging fi-
nancing for the venture or exporting its products. See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 8.
21 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 2.
27 Id.
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of China."2 Article 5 of FECL complements article 15 of the JV Reg-
ulations, which makes Chinese law applicable to "the formation of a
joint venture contract, its validity, interpretation, execution and the set-
tlement of disputes under it .... "-29
Although these provisions on their face are unobjectionable, and
the subjection of any joint venture incorporated and registered in the
PRC to the jurisdiction of Chinese law is reasonable, the fact that Chi-
nese law is undergoing such rapid development and is still relatively
rudimentary creates many problems for foreign investors. Specifically,
the foreign investor is concerned about how future developments in
Chinese law, which are certain to occur given the tremendous need for
such development and the Chinese government's desire to satisfy that
need, will impact on their present contractual rights and duties."0 Al-
though the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
(MOFERT) x has stated that "some provisions in the contract may
continue even though these provisions run counter to the newly
promulgated laws or regulations," 2 it is still uncertain which provi-
sions would be deemed valid or invalid. Moreover, although FECL
states that joint venture contracts which are executed in the PRC and
approved by the relevant state authorities "may still be performed ac-
cording to the stipulations of those contracts" in spite of new legal pro-
visions, 3 it is uncertain how this provision will be applied in practice.3
" See FECL, supra note 24, art. 5; Conroy, China's New Foreign Economic
Contract Law, INT'L FIN. L. REv., May, 1985, at 26; Gelatt, Legal and Extra-legal
Issues in Joint Venture Negotiations, 1 J. CHINESE L. 217, 227 (1987); Stoltenberg &
McClure, The Joint Venture and Related Contract Laws of Mainland China and
Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45, 85 (1987).
2 See JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 15; Stoltenberg & McClure, supra
note 28, at 85.
SO See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 203; Moser, supra note 5, at 118. For
thorough discussions of this issue, see Cohen, Some Problems of Investing in China, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 1983 67; Gelatt, supra note 28, at
227.
"' MOFERT was established in March 1982 as part of a comprehensive central-
level bureaucratic reorganization in which the Foreign Investment Commission (FIC)
and the Import-Export Commission (IEC) were amalgamated. See Brehm, supra note
6, at 20; Ludlow, China's New Foreign Trade Structure, CHINA Bus. REv., May-
June, 1982, at 30-33; The State of the Shuffle: Who's Heading What, Bus. CHINA,
Mar. 10, 1982, at 34. Before their combination, the FIC and the IEC were actually the
same organization, namely, the State Council's advisory office for foreign economic af-
fairs. See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 845 n.23. According to article 3 of the JV Law, the
FIC was responsible for approval of joint venture proposals. This responsibility was
given solely to MOFERT in article 8 of the JV Regulations. For an overview of the
organizational structure of the FIC and the IEC, see The PRC's Investment Control
and Import-Export Commissions, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 12-13.
32 Questions and Answers Concerning Foreign Investment in China, CHINA
ECON. NEWS, May 12, 1983, at 5.
*1 FECL, supra note 24, art. 40.
31 O.D. Nee, Jr., The Foreign Economic Contract Law: Practice Commentary, in
1 COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND TRADE LAWS: PEOPLE'S REUBLIC OF CHINA Bk. 4,
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It appears at the present time that the only way a foreign investor
can reduce the risk of subsequent adverse legislation is through the in-
clusion of "renegotiation clauses" in the joint venture contract. These
protective contractual provisions essentially provide for the renegoti-
ation of all or part of the joint venture contract should the foreign
party's investment be harmed by future Chinese legislation. Renegoti-
ation clauses of this type have been successfully negotiated in a few
cases, 5 although in general it is still the foreign investor who must
assume the substantial risk of future harmful legislation. The Foreign
party bears the risk because the Chinese party typically resists the in-
clusion of such clauses in the joint venture contract, or, if such a clause
is included, the Chinese party enjoys increased bargaining power dur-
ing renegotiation.
3. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JOINT VENTURE
3.1. The Approval Process
The foreign investor's first step toward the establishment of a joint
venture in the PRC is finding the right Chinese partner. 6 Because pri-
vate attempts to find the right Chinese partner usually fail3 7 and make
the ultimate success of the joint venture unlikely from the outset, 8 sev-
eral Chinese organizations exist to facilitate the matching of prospective
joint venture participants. On the national level, in addition to
MOFERT which approves and closely monitors joint venture opera-
tions, the foreign investor can contact the China International Trust
and Investment Corporation (CITIC), specialized corporations, or spe-
cialized law offices."9 Of these organizations, CITIC is probably the
most important. CITIC is defined as "a state-owned socialist enterprise
operating under the direct leadership of the State Council"4 whose
at 1. This provision has been called a "most liberal clause" despite its apparent condi-
tionality. Id. at 3, 4.
15 See Moser, supra note 5, at 118.
38 See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 67.
37 Id.
38 See Hendryx, The China Trade: Making the Deal Work, HARV. Bus. Ruv.,
July-Aug., 1986, at 75; Pye, The China Trade: Making the Deal, HARV. Bus. Rav.,
July-Aug., 1986, at 74.
" Yuqing, supra note 13, at 67-68. See also Lussenburg, Joint Venture Invest-
ment in the People's Republic of China: A Continuing Challenge, 63 CAN. BAR REV.
545, 551 (1985).
40 China International Trust and Investment Corporation Founded, Wen hui
bao (Shanghai), Oct. 5, 1979, at 2, quoted in Hsia & Haun, China's Joint Venture
Law: Part II, 1 CHINA L. RaP. 61, 61 (1980).
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purpose is to "introduce, absorb and apply foreign investment, ad-
vanced technology, and to import advanced equipment and to bring in
advanced technology for the purposes of China's national construction
and promotion of socialist modernization," '41 and also to "coordinate in-
itial contacts between foreigners and their Chinese partners."42
Even at this preliminary organizational level, however, the foreign
investor is confronted with potentially crippling difficulties since, in
working with CITIC, the foreign investor engages with a state-owned
enterprise in a country where such enterprises are notorious for their
bureaucratic inefficiency."' Surprisingly, even Wu Zhichao, Vice Presi-
dent of CITIC, admitted in February 1981 that he and his organiza-
tion were often baffled by China's Kafkaesque bureaucracy. 4 Finally,
the value of contacts with CITIC is questionable because to date its
role appears to be more peripheral than central within the Chinese
framework of governmental joint venture regulation.4
More significantly, perhaps, the foreign investor should be aware
of the institutionalization of conflicts of interest within these organiza-
4 Charter of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation, art. 2,
quoted in Hsia & Haun, supra note 40, at 61. An English translation of the CITIC
Charter can be found in Vol. 1, No. I of the CHINA L. REP.
"' See Rich, supra note 3, at 191. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 552. In
addition, if necessary, CITIC will aid in contract negotiations and the securing of for-
eign loans, and will act as an intermediary between Chinese and foreign parties. Id. In
the words of Rong Yirin, the chairman of the board of directors and president of
CITIC:
We will work with foreign investors in finding business opportunities for
them in China, putting them in touch with potential Chinese partners,
assisting them in negotiating the terms of a joint venture, and maintaining
a friendly interest in their success. If a foreigner wants to invest in China
but has no specific idea, we will advise him of opportunities. On the other
hand, we will also find suitable foreign partners on the request of our
national enterprises.
See An Exclusive Interview with Rong Yirin, Ta Kung Pao Weekly Supplement, No.
699, Nov. 15-21, 1979, at 4, quoted in Hsia & Haun, supra note 40, at 62. For
another description of CITIC, see International Trust, Investment Corporation to be
Formed, Xinhua (Beijing), July 9, 1979, reported in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMA-
TION SERVICE, July 10, 1979, at L8-L9. For a thorough, yet somewhat biased, discus-
sion of CITIC, see Yirin, China's Open Policy and CITIC's Role, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 57
(1986).
48 For general discussions of the difficulties experienced by foreigners in interac-
tion with the Chinese bureaucracy, see Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 82; Hsia
& Haun, supra note 40, at 79-83. For a discussion of strategies to cope with the Chi-
nese bureaucracy, see Lieberthal & Oksenberg, Understanding China's Bureaucracy,
CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec., 1986, at 24.
", In the words of Vice-President Wu, "In some cases, even we [CITIC] do not
know to whom (sic) in China we must contact in order to get investment information or
opinions." See Beijing Will Not Expand Foreign Ventures in '81, Bus. Standard
(Hong Kong), Feb. 12, 1981.
"' See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 83.
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tions. For example, the Great Wall Law Office, which is often retained
by foreign investors to prepare joint venture documentation, is staffed
by lawyers from MOFERT, which is responsible for joint venture
authorization."'
After the foreign investor finds a Chinese partner for the potential
joint venture, the JV Regulations require the parties to prepare a "pro-
ject proposal" and a "preliminary feasibility study," both of which
must be submitted to the "department in charge" by the Chinese
party.47 Two problems may arise at this point. First, the determination
of which authority is the proper "department in charge" can be a con-
fusing process with inconsistent results, since there is no clearly defined
rule that applies to all cases,4" Second, although the project proposal is
not legally binding, its terms are not easily changed once Chinese au-
thorities have approved them, despite the absence of formal negotiation
over them.49 Therefore, the unsuspecting foreign investor can find itself
trapped by potentially unfavorable and practically nonnegotiable terms
even at the preliminary "letter of intent" stage.
If initial approval is received from the "department in charge,"
and if the foreign and Chinese parties wish to further pursue the joint
venture, the next step is the application process. ° At this stage, the
Chinese partner is responsible for gaining approval not only from
MOFERT but also from the local authorities.5" The documents which
4' Kraar, supra note 13, at 88; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 68.
41 JV Regulations, supra note 10, ch. 2, art. 9(1). For a discussion of the details
of this provision, see Stoltenberg & McClure, supra note 28, at 71.
" See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 35. Judging from past approval practices, a general
rule can be inferred that "the Provinces of Guangdong and Fujian may approve invest-
ments up to any level without higher approval, that independent municipalities directly
under the State Council such as Beijing and Tianjin may approve investments up to
U.S.$10,000,000 without higher approval and Shanghai may approve investments up to
U.S.$30,000,000; and that Ministries and certain coastal provinces have authority to
approve investments between U.S.$3 and 5 million without higher approval; all other
investments must go to MOFERT for prior approval." Id. See also Moser, supra note
5, at 108.
Additionally, the JV Regulations are silent concerning who is to bear the cost of
preparing the feasibility study. It should therefore be considered an appropriate subject
of negotiation between the parties. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 552 n.31;
Stoltenberg & McClure, supra note 28, at 72 n.80; Swindler, supra note 3, at 1027
n.135.
9 See Gelatt, supra note 28, at 223; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 35. The terms of the
preliminary project proposal become solidified subsequent to their approval by the gov-
ernment because Chinese negotiators know, in a typically bureaucratic fashion, that
they should accede only to those terms which have been authorized by their superiors,
and they are thus very reluctant to transcend the originally proposed and approved
terms. Nee 1, supra note 1, at 35-36.
'0 Nee 1, supra note 1, at 36. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 552; Moser,
supra note 5, at 119, 123.
51 JV Regulations, supra note 10, arts. 8-10. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39,
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must be submitted after negotiation include an application for creation
of the joint venture,52 a secondary feasibility study, 3 the joint venture
agreement, contract and articles of association,54 a list of candidates for
the board of directors,55 and the opinion of the local authorities con-
cerning the establishment of the joint venture.56 The JV Regulations
require approval or rejection of the application within three months.
57
Within one month after approval, the joint venture must be registered
with the local bureau of the General Administration for Industry and
Commerce (GAIC) pursuant to the JV Regulations58 and the Regula-
tions of the People's Republic of China on the Registration of Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment.5
It is during this stage of the establishment process-after prelimi-
nary approval of the joint venture by the "department in charge" and
before the joint venture legally comes into being through its registration
with GAIC-that many difficulties arise for the foreign investor. First,
as a preliminary matter, it is absolutely imperative that the joint ven-
ture's contract agreement and articles of association be thoroughly ne-
gotiated and meticulously drafted, given China's undeveloped body of
commercial law.60 These documents should attempt to provide for all
foreseeable details of the joint venture's existence, and yet retain a mea-
sure of flexibility to accommodate subsequent changes of circum-
stance."1 Such forecasting is inherently difficult, but it will naturally be
more difficult for the foreign investor than the Chinese party due to the
Chinese party's superior knowledge of and familiarity with the legal,
political, economic and cultural forces in China which will impact on
at 553.
52 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 9(2)(a).
53 Id. art. 9(2)(b).
54 Id. art. 9(2)(c).
5 Id. art. 9(2)(d).
6 Id. art. 9(2)(e).
7 Id. art. 10.
'8 Id. art. 11. For a general discussion of the nature and structure of GAIC (also
referred to as GACIC - the General Administration for the Control of Industry and
Commerce), see Lutz, The General Administration for the Control of Industry and
Commerce, CHINA Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 25.
1 See The Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Registration of
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, art. 2, promulgated by The
State Council, July 26, 1980, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus., 7,841.
60 See P. VERZARIU & D. STEIN, JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS IN THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 20 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Int'l Trade Admin., Nov.,
1982).
6' Id. It is common for Chinese negotiators to resist the inclusion of such detail
and specificity in the joint venture contract when foreign interests are concerned. When,
however, Chinese interests are at stake, Chinese negotiators are eager to use detailed
language. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 199.
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the joint venture's operations. In this respect, the foreign investor will
certainly be at a negotiating disadvantage relative to the Chinese party.
Second, in order to obtain a favorable contract with a Chinese
party, the foreign investor must be prepared to invest large quantities
of both time and money in the negotiation process.62 Although it is
sometimes possible to negotiate a joint venture contract in as little as six
months, one commentator suggests that it is reasonable to plan on a
three year negotiation period.63 This will necessarily be feasible for
only wealthy and determined investors. 4
Many factors combine to create the notoriously slow pace of Chi-
nese negotiations. First, as previously mentioned, the Chinese party
tends to become intransigent over terms already approved by higher
authorities at the preliminary letter of intent stage, even though it is
precisely these terms that the foreign party intended to reserve for ne-
gotiation during the formal negotiation period.6 Second, due to the
PRC's self-imposed international isolation, which ended only in 1978
through the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese negotiators are gener-
ally unfamiliar with international customs and practices, and thus bar-
62 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 198-99. See also Moser, supra note 5, at
116 ("Negotiations have often proved to be lengthy and complicated, burdened by the
bureaucratic style of Chinese decision-making").
6 See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 554. For example, contract negotiation pro-
ceeded for several years in both the Great Wall Hotel and the Schindler Elevator joint
ventures. See Birenbaum & Alford, supra note 7, at 26. The ITT joint venture contract
required over six years to negotiate. See Brown, Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures: Contem-
porary Developments and Historical Perspective, 1 J. NORTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 25,
41 (1982).
Due to such sizeable initial expenditures of both time and money, the foreign
investor's decision to participate in a joint venture must be viewed as a long term com-
mitment. Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 554. This is, in fact, the way in which existing
or potential foreign joint venture participants see their investment. See Bums, Why
Investors Are Sour on China, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at F7, col. 1 ("In every case,
U.S. partners are paying a very high price to be in China now because their parent
corporations have made a strategic decision to enter the China market for the long
term. They have taken a great commercial and potential political risk, and, for most,
the potential payoff is still years away.")
See Bloomfield, Legal Aspects of Joint Ventures in China, INT'L Bus. LAW.,
Oct., 1986, at 335. Chinese authorities and commentators have acknowledged this fact,
and therefore urge that joint ventures be reserved for industrial projects involving large
capital expenditures and sophisticated technology. See Brehm, supra note 6, at 16.
65 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Chinese negotiators are not autono-
mous risk takers and entrepreneurs who may bargain freely, but are constrained by
strict governmental supervision. See P. VERZARIU & D. STEIN, supra note 60, at 11. A
related problem stems from the fact that Chinese negotiators cling tenaciously to the
form joint venture contract and articles of association developed by MOFERT, despite
MOFERT's intention to make the model simply a starting point for negotiations. Be-
cause the model is in many ways heavily weighted in favor of the Chinese party, for-
eign parties must make vigorous efforts to depart from the MOFERT model. Typi-
cally, a lengthy "battle of the forms" ensues. See Gelatt, supra note 28, at 224.
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gain for terms and conditions which are unknown in the rest of the
world.6" Third, foreign investors have suggested that in increasingly
frequent instances, negotiations languish until bribes or kickbacks are
given to Chinese negotiators to "grease the deal.""7 Finally, the slow
Chinese negotiating process can be explained by the desire to reach the
most favorable contract, which causes the Chinese to use protracted ne-
gotiations and plan-revisions as techniques to increase their leverage at
the bargaining table.6"
A third problem that frequently arises during the negotiation pe-
riod is delay, not from the Chinese negotiators, but from the Chinese
governmental entities at either the national or local level. The typical
joint venture must obtain approval not simply from MOFERT, but
from a host of governmental bodies.69 These authorities jealously pro-
tect their jurisdiction and autonomy, and consequently shun interdepen-
dence and coordination.7 0 It is common for routine matters to become
lost in China's bureaucratic maze, sometimes for several years.7 1 Al-
though the EFI Regulations seek to reduce such delays through greater
"8 Further, China's lack of experience in establishing and operating joint ventures
necessitates the resolution of fundamental and relatively simple issues on a case-by-case
basis. See Moser, supra note 5, at 116. China's self-imposed international isolation and
its promotion of self-reliance was largely a consequence of a strong mistrust of foreign-
ers and foreign influences. This mistrust developed as a result of a history of foreign
practices within China, committed primarily by Western countries, that the Chinese
viewed as exploitative. See Swindler, supra note 3, at 1010 n.19. This suspicion of
foreign influences is still present, as evidenced by the cautious attitude with which
China permits foreign investment within its borders. See Hsia & Haun, supra note 4,
at 6; P. VERZARIU & D. STEIN, supra note 60, at 10.
87 The Chinese term for such practices is hao cho, which literally means "nice
benefit from a business deal." Kraar, supra note 13, at 86, 88. See also Cohen &
Valentine, supra note 3, at 195; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 68.
"8 See P. VERZARIU & D. STEIN, supra note 60, at 11. Another Chinese negotia-
tion technique that is frequently a source of irritation to foreign investors is reference to
"internal regulations" that, according to the Chinese, determine the resolution of a par-
ticular issue, but which are unavailable for the foreign party's inspection. Such secret
laws do, in fact, often exist, but sometimes foreign investors sense that Chinese appeals
to internal regulations are merely ploys to increase bargaining power. See Gelatt, supra
note 28, at 229-30.
" For example, such governmental bodies include the General Taxation Bureau
of the Ministry of Finance, the Customs Administration, the General Administration
for Exchange Control, and the Bank of China. See Baigen, China: New Provisions to
Encourage Foreign Investment, INT'L Bus. LAW., May, 1987, at 204, 205. Additional
governmental bodies include the China International Trust and Investment Corpora-
tion, the Foreign Investment Bureau, and the General Administration for Industry and
Commerce. See Stoltenberg & McClure, supra note 28, at 70.
10 See generally, Lieberthal and Oksenberg, supra note 43, at 24. To make mat-
ters worse, there can be inconsistent and conflicting opinions even within the same
governmental authority. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 200.
71 See Baigen, supra note 69, at 205.
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interdepartmental cooperation,"7 Chinese bureaucrats will likely be un-
willing or unable to apply the new provisions in practice.7"
A fourth and final problem that can arise during this negotiation
period stems from the vagueness of the approval authority's criteria for
obtaining approval of joint ventures. Aside from the minimum condi-
tions expressed in articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the JV Regulations, the
Chinese authorities have never explained their basis for approval of
joint ventures."4 Consequently, after investing significant time and
money in an effort to negotiate a favorable joint venture contract, the
foreign investor may discover that the contract is unacceptable to the
approval authority for some previously undisclosed reason."5 In sum,
the entire joint venture approval process sometimes resembles a shot in
the dark.
3.2. Capitalization of the Joint Venture
The JV Law requires, as regards the capital structure of the joint
venture, that the foreign party must hold at least twenty-five percent of
the registered capital. 7' There is no specified maximum percentage of
72 The EFI Regulations provide that the "various levels of the People's Govern-
ment and relevant departments in charge should strengthen and improve their coordi-
nation and efficiency and promptly examine and approve applications by foreign invest-
ment enterprises on matters requiring reply or resolution." EFI Regulations, supra
note 15, art. 17.
71 See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 117. The force of article 17 is undermined by its
inclusion of a three month time limit for the approval or non-approval of joint venture
documents. Because article 10 of the JV Regulations contain an identical three month
time limit, governmental approval authorities will probably interpret article 17 of the
EFI Regulations as simply sanctioning "business as usual." See Cohen & Chang, New
Foreign Investment Provisions, CHINA Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb., 1987, at 11, 13.
71 See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 553 n.35. Commentators have suggested,
however, that the Yugoslav law on joint ventures be used by analogy. See Klingenberg
& Pattison, supra note 3, at 820-21. The Yugoslav joint venture law specifies the crite-
ria for approval as being 1) compliance with applicable laws and regulations, 2) eco-
nomic benefit, 3) sufficiency of participants' financial resources to implement the pro-
posals, 4) fairness of provisions according to customary international standards, 5)
equitable valuation of foreigner's capital contribution, and 6) the furtherance of current
national trade and economic policies. See Rich, supra note 3, at 193.
7 Obtaining approval from the various government authorities is a frustrating
experience largely because the authorities often require the foreign party to make con-
cessions, in addition to those already made at the bargaining table, before approval is
granted. See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 200 ("[F]oreign investors have be-
come frustrated by the frequency with which PRC examination and approval authori-
ties demand changes in crucial terms which the parties can agree on between them-
selves under Chinese law .... The result ... is that the foreign party often feels that it
has been placed in an unfair bargaining position, especially when, as frequently hap-
pens, it is informed of the conditions for approval shortly before the date scheduled for
the festivities announcing the contract."). See also Gelatt, supra note 28, at 226.
71 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 4. This investment floor is an attempt by the Chi-
nese government to ensure that the foreign investor's participation is sufficiently great
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registered capital that the foreign investor may hold, thus making it
possible for a joint venture to be ninety-nine percent foreign owned."
Nevertheless, as articles 21 through 24 of the JV Regulations make
clear, there are significant restrictions governing the registered capital
of a joint venture, which in some cases can be particularly burdensome
for the foreign investor."
Joint venture capital contributions may take many forms. A joint
venture participant may contribute cash, in-kind contributions such as
machinery, materials and equipment, or intangible property such as
patents, trademarks and other intellectual property.7 9 In addition, the
Chinese participant is permitted to contribute land-use rights."0
The valuation of capital contributions in forms other than cash in
order to determine the capital structure of the joint venture has proved
to be an intractable and pervasive problem. First, concerning capital
contributions by Chinese participants which typically take the forms of
buildings and land-use rights,"1 the valuation of land-use rights has
been arbitrary and subject to abuse. Unlike the valuation of other capi-
tal contributions, which can be ascertained through consultation be-
tween the parties with reference to international market prices 2 or, in
the absence of an international market price, through appraisal by a
third party appointed by the joint venture participants,83 the valuation
to motivate it to make a commitment to the success of the joint venture. Hsia & Haun,
supra note 4, at 14.
7 See Moser, supra note 5, at 120. In practice, the distribution of the registered
capital of joint ventures is generally 50:50 or 49:51, the majority position in the latter
case usually being held by the Chinese participant. Id. Although there has been specu-
lation concerning the possibility of 100% foreign ownership of joint ventures, see Rich,
supra note 3, at 196, neither experience nor the underlying principles of the joint ven-
ture legislation support such a conclusion. Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 554. Such
100% foreign ownership would not constitute a joint venture, and thus the joint venture
legislation would be inapplicable. Hsia & Haun, supra note 4, at 14. See also An
Exclusive Interview with Rong Yirin, supra note 42, at 6. Instead, a 100% foreign-
owned enterprise would be governed by the SFI Law and related legislation.
78 See Moser, supra note 5, at 121.
" JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 25.
8o Id. arts. 25, 48.
81 See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329. In general, the investment composition
preferred by Chinese negotiators results in the Chinese participant contributing land-
use rights, buildings and premises, and the foreign participant contributing industrial
property, know-how, and advanced technology. Id. For an example of such an arrange-
ment, see Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Venture Elevator Company in the
People's Republic of China among China Construction Machinery and Schindler
Holdings AG and Jardine Schindler (Far East) Holdings SA, reprinted in F. DE
BANN & B. DEWIT, CHINA TRADE LAW 59 (1982).
82 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 25. See VERZARIU & STEIN, supra note
60, at 25. See also Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at
555.
83 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 25. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 555.
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of land-use rights is reserved by the JV Regulations exclusively for the
Chinese government."4 Such unilateral determination of land-use values
by the Chinese government is necessarily arbitrary since there is no free
market mechanism by which the fair market value of real property can
be measured.85 Moreover, the local government which is responsible for
appraisal of land-use rights is permitted to collect and retain the land-
use fee, and therefore has an incentive to inflate the appraised value of
such rights.86 Although the EFI Regulationss and several local regula-
tions88 establish ceilings for site use fees, the ceilings are still high and
do not apply to many joint ventures.8" Therefore, in order to avoid be-
coming the victim of arbitrary and excessive land-use fees, the foreign
investor must take great pains carefully to investigate, negotiate, and
include the site value in the joint venture contract or articles."0
Second, concerning capital contributions by foreign investors which
typically consist of technologically advanced equipment and industrial
property,9 the JV Regulations impose numerous restrictions on both
in-kind contributions and industrial property rights. To be acceptable
as a capital contribution, any machinery, equipment or materials from
the foreign party must be "indispensable" to the operations of the joint
venture,9" must be unable to be produced in China (or is produced in
China at "too high" a price93), and its price to the joint venture must
not be higher than the international market price for the same or simi-
8 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 49. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 556.
See also Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329.
815 See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 556 ("the lack of an open market to deter-
mine site values makes such designations arbitrary."); Nee 1, supra note 1, at 10-11;
Swindler, supra note 3, at 1030.
" See Swindler, supra note 3, at 1030. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note
3, at 197.
87 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 4.
88. See, e.g., The Shanghai Municipality Trial Measures for the Administra-
tion of Site Use Rights of Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures and the Site Use Fees
to be Charged, reprinted and translated in E. ELiASOPH, LAW AND BUSINESS PRAC-
TICE IN SHANGHAI 79 (1987).
89 See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 13. For example, the land-use fee ceiling contained
in the EFI Regulations only applies to export enterprises and technologically advanced
enterprises. Moreover, the exception in article 4 of the EFI Regulations that makes the
land-use fee ceiling inapplicable to joint ventures located in "busy urban areas of large
cities" may swallow the rule if interpreted broadly. Such a broad interpretation would
be detrimental to many joint ventures that must, for various reasons, be located in or
near metropolitan areas. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 197.
80 See Lussenberg, supra note 39, at 556; Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329. See
generally Gelatt, supra note 28, at 233-34.
9 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 28(1).
92 Id. art. 27(1).
93 Id. art. 27(2).
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lar items.94 In addition, any industrial property contributed to the joint
venture by the foreign party must be capable of manufacturing prod-
ucts "urgently" needed in China or products suitable for export,95 must
be capable of improving "markedly" the performance and quality of
existing products,96 or must be capable of "notable" savings in raw
materials, fuel, or power.9" The EFI Regulations appear to have low-
ered the Chinese criteria for advanced technology, so that technology
the Chinese do not presently possess is acceptable as a foreign investor's
capital contribution.98 If, however, the foreign investor is deemed to
have failed to meet these criteria, or, as article 5 of the JV Law states,
failed to supply technology or equipment "truly advanced and appro-
priate to China's needs," the foreign party will be held liable for dam-
ages. 9 Because these criteria are not free from ambiguity, the capital
contribution of the foreign investor will depend on their good faith ap-
plication by the approval authority.1 00
Additionally, the foreign investor who contributes technology to
the joint venture must be cautious about the timing of the transfer. If
the foreign party transfers technology to the Chinese party before the
contract is approved and signed, the foreign party will be at a loss
should the contract fail to be implemented for some reason."' This
problem can obviously be avoided by waiting until the contract is im-
plemented before the technology is transferred to the Chinese party. If,
however, the technology must be delivered before the contract is ap-
proved and signed, then the foreign investor should provide in a sepa-
94 Id. art. 27(3).
95 Id. art. 28(1).
96 Id. art. 28(2).
97 Id. art. 28(3).
" EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 2(2). See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 14;
Yuqing, supra note 13, at 107.
" JV Law, supra note 3, art. 5. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 556 n.56. See
also Goodrich, Joint Ventures in the PRC: A Legal Analysis in the Context of Current
Chinese Economic and Political Considerations, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521,
531 (1982).
100 In addition to the vagueness of the aforementioned terminology, there may be a
contradiction of terms. In particular, there may be a conflict between technology that is
"truly advanced" and technology that is "appropriate to China's needs." This poses a
dilemma for both the foreign investor and MOFERT, which is responsible for deter-
mining what is appropriate for "China's needs," insofar as China is probably not yet in
a stage of development in which it can effectively utilize "truly advanced" technology.
See Hsia & Haun, supra note 40, at 75; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 556. This
predicament may have been partially solved with the enactment of the Regulations on
Administration of Technology Import Contracts of the People's Republic of China,
promulgated by The State Council, May 24, 1985, reprinted and translated in CHINA
L. FOR. Bus. 6,683. The Regulations help to provide foreign investors with rough
guidelines concerning what technology is acceptable to the Chinese.
1I See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329.
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rate agreement for payment by the Chinese party should the joint ven-
ture contract fail through no fault of the foreign investor.1 2
4. MANAGEMENT OF THE JOINT VENTURE
4.1. Control and Administration of the Joint Venture
4.1.1. The Board of Directors
According to the JV Law and the JV Regulations, the "highest
authority" within each joint venture is the board of directors. 10 3 The
directors are to be appointed by the parties to the joint venture, the
number of directors appointed by each party being determined by "con-
sultation" among the parties with reference to their equity shares.'
The chairman of the board must be appointed by the Chinese party,
the vice-chairman by the foreign party.'05
102 Id.
103 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 6; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 33. See
Jaslow, supra note 3, at 218.
104 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 6; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 34. See
Gelatt, supra note 28, at 236. By permitting board composition to be determined
through negotiation rather than strict adherence to equity participation, the JV Law
and the JV Regulations distinguish between ownership and control of the joint venture.
See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 557. But see P.
VERZARIU & D. STE N, supra note 60, at 33. For example, in the now defunct Sanyo
refrigeration joint venture, only six out of ten board members were Japanese appoin-
tees despite 75% foreign equity participation. See Pattison, China's Developing Legal
Framework for Foreign Investment: Experience and Expectations, 13 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 89, 114 (1981). In the Sino-French Joint Venture Winery Ltd. between
Tianjin Vineyard and Remy Martin, the French partner holds only a 38% equity share
yet has 50% of the seats on the board. See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329.
A majority of the board seats, however, does not equate with effective control of
the joint venture. In fact, Rong Yirin has stated that a majority position on the board is
unimportant because "[glenerally speaking, the board of directors should reach unani-
mous decisions through consultation." See An Exclusive Interview with Rong Yirin,
supra note 42, at 6. See also Gelatt, supra note 28, at 236-37. Therefore, because
article 6 of the JV Law mandates that board decisions be reached through "consulta-
tion ... on the principle of equality and mutual benefit," minority interests are accom-
modated and any gap between equity participation in, and control of the joint venture
may be effectively bridged. See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329-30; Lussenburg,
supra note 39, at 558.
105 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 6; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 34. The
Chinese government has insisted that the Chinese party retain the right to appoint the
chairman. Initially, this meant that the chairman had to be a Chinese national. See
Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 558; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 14. The Chinese text of the
JV Law supports this conclusion, since the characters in the Chinese text that have
been translated as "appointed" are "dan ren," which in practice means "assumed by."
See Hsia & Haun, supra note 4, at 15 n. 17. Moreover, Rong Yiren indicated that a
Chinese national must assume the chairman's position when he said that "foreign part-
ners can be vice-presidents on boards of directors" but did not include the chairman as
a possible position for foreign participants. Id. at 15-16. According to the Chinese, "a
Chinese chairman will enjoy the advantage of an easy approach to the Chinese people
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Decision making at the board level has generally been a source of
irritation for foreign joint venture participants. The principal complaint
seems to be the same one voiced by foreign investors during the contract
negotiation phase-the extremely slow pace of Chinese decision mak-
ing.108 Board meetings can continue for several days even when the
agenda and issues are simple and clear.
10 7
The persistent sluggishness in board deliberations can be ex-
plained first by the fact that the Chinese directors are always reluctant
to transcend the basic premises of the authorized joint venture contract
because they know that within the state bureaucracy no action should
be taken without first obtaining approval from a superior.10 8 In addi-
tion, in accordance with both Chinese tradition and the JV Law, Chi-
nese directors strive to reach decisions "through consultation by the
participants on the principle of equity and mutual benefit,"' 9 rather
than through a confrontational voting mechanism characteristic of
Western board decision making. Although such consultation may be
beneficial to the foreign interests which often constitute a minority of
the board, it does not easily lend itself to deliberational efficiency be-
cause it engenders protracted negotiation. 0 Finally, although Chinese
law requires unanimity of the board in only four situations,1 ' in prac-
tice unanimity is required for most, if not all, board decisions. This is
because, at the Chinese participant's behest, the board usually consists
of an equal number of Chinese appointed and foreign appointed direc-
tors, who normally vote in blocks.112 Therefore, unless the two groups
agree, director deadlock will result for even the most ordinary deci-
sions.11 ' Government interference is an additional obstacle to effective
either vertically or horizontally." See Note, supra note 7, at 138 n.184. Nevertheless,
through time, practice has proved that the Chinese are flexible on this point and some-
times are willing to appoint a foreign chairman. See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 329;
Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 558.
106 See Huan, China's Open Door Policy, 1978 - 1984, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 1, 13
(1986). See also Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 330; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 16.
107 See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 16.
108 Id.
109 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 6. See also Jaslow, supra note 3, at 225.
110 See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 330.
"I1 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 36. The four situations requiring a unani-
mous board are: (1) Amendment of the articles of association of the joint venture; (2)
Termination and dissolution of the joint venture; (3) Increase or assignment of the
registered capital of the joint venture; (4) Merger of the joint venture with other eco-
nomic organizations. Id.
112 See Moser, supra note 5, at 125.
113 One commentator suggests that the possibility of director deadlock can be min-
imized by the inclusion of four provisions in the joint venture articles of association.
First, issues other than those listed in article 38 of the JV Regulations as requiring a
unanimous vote should be decided by a simple majority vote. Second, if a matter cannot
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decision making at the board level.114 Chinese governmental entities
frequently countermand board decisions without any consultation or
explanation. 15 Moreover, some issues which foreign investors perceive
as fundamental to joint venture operations are not even given to the
board to decide, but are reserved for the Chinese government."' 8 Such
government interference disrupts joint venture operations, infringes
upon joint venture autonomy, and reduces any joint venture's chances
of success.
117
The EFI Regulations attempt to address this problem in article
15. Article 15 is perhaps the most significant legal concession given by
the Chinese goverfiment in the EFI Regulations insofar as it grants
joint ventures autonomy and decision making authority over a number
of fundamental issues."1 For example, article 15 provides that joint
ventures may "within the scope of business approved in their contracts,
... set their own production and operation plans,... raise and utilize
funds, . . .purchase production materials, . . . market their products
and . . .set their own level of wages, method of salary payment and
systems of bonuses and allowances" and may "in accordance with their
production and operational requirements, determine their own struc-
ture and personnel system, employ or dismiss senior operational and
management personnel and add or dismiss workers."'1 9 This is clearly
a laudable change, although it remains to be seen how article 15 will be
interpreted 2 ° with respect to prior joint venture legislation,121 and how
it will be applied in practice by the Chinese authorities. 2
be decided by a vote, then a deadline must be established for the "consultation" period.
Third, if the board is unable to resolve the issue through consultation, then the question
may be referred to arbitration. Finally, if the problem proves to be insurmountable, the
foreign partner is entitled to withdraw from the joint venture. See Bloomfield, supra
note 64, at 330.
114 It is also an obstacle at the managerial level. See infra note 134.
115 Baigen, supra note 69, at 204, 205; Hendryx, supra note 38, at 75, 83; Kraar,
supra note 13, at 86, 87.
116 For example, the Chinese government makes final decisions on product pricing
and raw materials and energy resources allocation to permit conformity with the na-
tional economic plan. See Baigen, supra note 111, at 205; Bloomfield, supra note 64, at
330; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 17-18.
11I See, e.g., Baigen, supra note 69, at 205 ("[I]n June, 1986, both the General
Manager and the Deputy General Manager of the Sino-US Parker Sealing Parts Com-
pany were dismissed by the Machinery Industry Department of the Hubei Provincial
Government without consultation with the company's board of directors. Although this
government agency's decision was put right after five months, the company's operations
had already been disrupted.").
118 Yuqing, supra note 13, at 115-17.
119 See EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 15.
20 MOFERT has the authority to interpret these provisions. Id. art. 21.
121 See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
122 While there are currently examples of joint ventures enjoying considerable au-
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4.1.2. Management
In the joint venture hierarchy, beneath the board of directors is the
management of the joint venture operations.12 The management of
each joint venture is to be appointed by its board of directors, " " may be
comprised of either Chinese or foreign citizens, 25 and is responsible for
organizing and conducting the daily operations of the joint venture.1 26
The decision making process at the managerial level, like that at
the Board of Directors level, is cumbersome. The deputy system has
developed independently of the JV Law or the JV Regulations. Under
the deputy system, the typical joint venture contract provides that the
foreign party is to appoint the top-level management positions, such as
the President, while the Chinese party is to appoint the deputy counter-
part, such as the Vice President. 27 The first drawback of such a system
is that, because it effectively doubles the size of the management staff,
management of the joint venture will tend to be excessively and inef-
ficiently large. The second problem is that in practice, all decisions
must be made jointly by both the manager and the deputy manager. 28
This shared managerial decision making, although furthering the im-
portant principle of equality that is traditionally vital in dealing with
the Chinese, impedes the managerial deliberation process, and can po-
tentially bring the decision making process to a halt should the two
disagree as to the proper course of action. A final difficulty of the dep-
uty system is that the Chinese workforce will naturally tend to follow
the directions of the Chinese deputy manager more closely than the
directions of the foreign manager, if indeed the foreign manager's direc-
tions are followed at all, thus again limiting the effectiveness of the
manager's decision making power.12 9
A second problem occurring frequently in the management of a
joint venture concerns the operations of management committees. These
management committees, which typically consist of an equal number of
Chinese and foreign appointed managers, are responsible for a substan-
tial portion of the joint venture's management decisions. The manage-
tonomy, Gargan, Riding China's Capitalist Road, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1987, § 3, at
4, col. 3, others have experienced considerable government interference. See supra note
117.
1 See Moser, supra note 5, at 124-25; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 15.
124 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 6; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 40.
125 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 40.
126 Id. arts. 38, 39. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 559 (discussing appoint-
ment procedure and role for each management position).
127 See Moser, supra note 5, at 125.
128 See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 15.
129 Id.
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ment committee, however, often experiences the same problems com-
monly encountered at the director level, namely, extremely slow
decision making due to the requisite consultation, and deadlock due to
equalized block voting.'30 Because many of the decisions delegated to
management committees cannot effectively be made in such an atmo-
sphere, they are in practice forced back up the chain of command to be
made at the director level."3 ' The directors are then required to grapple
with routine decisions in a setting certainly no more, and probably less
conducive to decision making than that at the managerial level.
Departmental independence is a third management problem. For-
eign managers soon discover that they are unable to implement estab-
lished plans because departments within the joint venture refuse to co-
operate with one another." 2 This lack of coordination is because
Chinese corporate departments, like most entities within Chinese soci-
ety, cherish their independence and self sufficiency.' Moreover, the
ties which joint venture departments do have are vertical, to govern-
ment supervisors, rather than horizontal, to other departments. 4 The
130 Many of the problems experienced in the management of a joint venture can
be traced to the fact that Chinese management skills are often rudimentary or radically
different than those of foreign managers. See Pattison, supra note 104, at 172. See also
Stepanek, Joint Ventures: Why U.S. Firms are Cautious, 10 CHINA Bus. REv., July-
Aug., 1980, at 32-33; Hayden, Foreign Partners' Problems in Joint Ventures in
China, Asian Wall St. J., July 1, 1981, at 6, cols. 5-6. Moreover, attempts by foreign
managers to teach the Chinese new management skills often prove to be extremely
difficult. In the words of one U.S. manager working in China:
They accept new ways of management in principle, but they have diffi-
culty putting them into practice. The biggest problem is that they don't
know how to define what a problem is. The reasons for a failure have
never been accepted or explored. It's the old "face" thing. Management
doesn't want to hear about uncertainties or failures, only accomplished
facts .... They don't work together as a good team. Part of the problem
we've had is getting them to work together; we've had to force them to
hold meetings where everybody who should be present is present ....
They don't like to get into a meeting where they have to talk about
problems. No one will commit to anything until the problem's been solved.
That's been the toughest thing to try to change.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Incoming Telegram, Subject: After the Contract is Signed:
The Experience of U.S. Companies in Shanghai, International Trade Administration:
China Office 4 (Aug. 1984) cited in Golden, supra note 7, at 407 n.81 [hereinafter
After the Contract].
131 See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 16.
133 Hendryx, supra note 38, at 81 ("From the very beginning of any Chinese joint
venture, foreign managers find they can't execute agreed-to plans because department
heads won't coordinate their activities with one another.").
133 "Fiefdoms" occur when various functions develop a sense of autonomy.
"Shanto juyi, or 'mountain peakism,' is a Chinese term: 'This mountain peak is my
territory; the others are not my concern.'" Id. at 82.
13, "One reason [interdepartmental] coordination is difficult is that the different
departments in a Chinese company have more allegiance to-and ties with-their
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result is that large projects that require interdepartmental cooperation
fail, and small projects that can be accomplished within a single depart-
ment are duplicated within many.1" 5
A final managerial problem experienced by foreign joint venture
investors arises from uncertainty concerning who is truly the decision
making authority. In some instances, managers receive little or no di-
rection from the board due to the aforementioned deliberational
problems at the board level.3 8 Even if management does receive direc-
tion from the board, however, plans are often stymied due to lack of
departmental cooperation or government interference.1 37 In such an en-
vironment, the foreign manager is typically able to achieve little.
4.2. Operational Matters: Supply, Pricing, and Marketing
The JV Law and the JV Regulations state that a joint venture
must, all other things being equal, preferentially utilize Chinese-sup-
plied components and raw materials.13 ' The three difficulties com-
monly mentioned by foreign investors concerning Chinese sourcing are
the frequent supply shortages of such materials, the inferior quality of
the materials when their supply is adequate, and the high international
counterparts in the planning and government bureaucracy than they have to other de-
partments in their own organization .... It's just as if the treasurer of IBM reported
through state channels to the secretary of the treasury in Washington." Id. at 81.
138 Hendryx provides an example of two departments' needless duplication of
work:
In one case, for example, to better control inventory and lay the founda-
tion for an MRP-type production planning system, two computer operator
trainees and a dozen stockroom clerks checked and input 15,000 inventory
items into the computerized system, including about 7,000 purchased com-
ponents. At the same time, the finance department took steps to implement
a badly needed cost-accounting system by creating a master list of pur-
chased parts with updated standard costs. They used the same Chinese
data base software as the computer operators to create the standard cost
files. Despite repeated requests from the foreign manager that the two
groups coordinate their efforts, neither did so. The finance departments
man entered the inventory items but used different part numbers and dif-
ferent names and descriptions along with the standard cost for the 7,000
purchased items. Chaos ensued. For more than three months, people
worked side by side and never talked about what they were doing-they
were from different departments.
Id.
138 See supra § 4.1.1. See also Hendryx, supra note 38, at 83. ("When foreign
managers complain that they can't get anything done, what they really mean is that
they can't figure out who's in charge-who's supposed to make the decisions.").
137 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (lack of departmental coopera-
tion) and notes 113-17 and accompanying text (governmental interference).
18 JV Law, supra note 3, art. 9; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 57. See also
Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 560; Swindler, supra note 3, at 1032-33.
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market price that they must pay for the materials."3 9
Regarding the problem of Chinese supply shortages, many joint
ventures have been forced to halt production, sometimes for several
months, when contractually guaranteed sources fail to deliver necessary
components or raw materials.14 ° This is clearly the most serious and
potentially ruinous problem with Chinese sourcing. Article 5 of the
EFI Regulations seeks to alleviate this problem by giving priority to
export enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises in obtaining
"water, power and transportation and communications facilities."'"
This provision, however, falls short of assuring the foreign investor that
these essential services will be available, and excludes many other
materials that the joint venture would prefer to obtain domestically.
Even if the supply of necessary components and raw materials is
adequate, however, the quality of such inputs is frequently inferior to
international standards, thus making it difficult or impossible to export
the finished product. This problem has been voiced repeatedly by Japa-
nese investors, who are renowned for their meticulous quality control
standards. 42
Finally, the pricing of Chinese-supplied inputs may present vari-
ous problems, depending upon the particular component or raw mate-
rial the joint venture is required to purchase. If, for instance, the joint
venture purchases any of the six raw materials designated in article
"39 See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 863-64; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 560. See
also U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Incoming Telegram, Subject: Japanese Investment in
China 3 (Aug. 1984) quoted in Golden, supra note 7, at 401 n.48 [hereinafter Japa-
nese Investment in China] (stating that "parts are often of inferior quality; despite this
fact, the joint venture will be charged the internationally prevailing price. This means
the foreign investor can be squeezed on one side by Chinese determination of produc-
tion costs (both fixed and variable) and on the other by Chinese setting the selling
price."); Bums, A.M.C.'s Troubles in China, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at Dl, col.
1, D4, col. 1 (Director of engineering at Jeep Automobile joint venture stating that
"[the Chinese tell us they can provide virtually everything, but it doesn't work that
way. When you find a supplier, it almost always turns out that he can't guarantee the
quantity or quality, or the prices are out of line, or they want to sell you 10,000 items
when all you need is a few hundred.").
140 See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 198 ("Availability of quality inputs
at any price is often a problem."). See also Fenwick, supra note 5, at 863; Lussenburg,
supra note 39, at 562; Swindler, supra note 3, at 1033; Beijing Plant for Japanese TV
Giant, Money: South China Morning Post, Dec. 7, 1986, at 3 (Hitachi's color televi-
sion joint venture was forced to halt operations for several months in 1986 due to lack
of components).
141 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 5.
142 See Japanese Investment in China, supra note 139, at 3 (Japanese investors
noting that the inferior quality of Chinese components undermines Japanese quality
control standards and provides another factor which discourages the export of finished
products in a competitive market). See also Bums, supra note 63 (A.M.C. was able to
export none of the 800 Jeeps produced in China in 1986).
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65(1) of the JV Regulations- gold, silver, platinum, petroleum, coal,
and timber-and uses them directly in production for export, the joint
venture must pay the international market price, and may pay in either
renminbi or foreign exchange."" If, however, the joint venture requires
import or export materials handled by Chinese foreign trade compa-
nies, the joint venture must pay a price negotiated with reference to the
prevailing international market price, and must pay in foreign ex-
change.""' This latter requirement can be particularly burdensome for
the joint venture insofar as foreign exchange accounts are frequently
difficult to balance. 4 Finally, all other materials required by the joint
venture may be purchased at the price charged state-owned enterprises,
and may be paid for in renminbi.1
6
Regardless of the particular Chinese input the joint venture wants
to purchase, however, it is probable that its price will be inflated, a fact
to which the rash of price gouging incidents attests.14 7 The EFI Regu-
lations, in article 16, attempt to remedy this problem by stating that the
"Notice of the State Council on Halting the Practice of Indiscriminate
Charging of Enterprises" will be enforced. 48 It also provides that joint
ventures may refuse to pay unreasonable charges and may appeal the
charges to the local or national economic commissions. 9 Once again,
however, the foreign investor must wait to see how this provision will
be applied in practice. 5
"s JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 65(1). The international market prices are
provided by the State General Administration of Foreign Exchange Control or foreign
trade departments. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 561.
144 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 65(2). See also Lussenburg, supra note
39, at 561.
141 See Nee 1, supra note 1, at 18.
146 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 65(3). See also Lussenburg, supra note
39, at 561.
141 See Kraar, supra note 13, at 86 ("Unrealistic pricing of raw materials also
sabotages projects. Beatrice wanted to make orange juice concentrate in Canton but
gave up after China offered the most expensive oranges in the world."). See also Cohen
& Valentine, supra note 3, at 194 ("Prices and charges often bear no relation to the
quality of the goods or services provided, or to the prices and charges paid by PRC
enterprises or nationals."). In addition to fraudulent pricing practices, the inflated
prices of processed and semi-processed goods can also be explained by inefficiency and
low productivity. Id. at 198.
114 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 16.
149 Id.
1"0 One author identifies a problem in the unrealized potential of the law due to
inconsistency between the law and policy decided at the national level. The example he
provides is a law which allows the possibility of creating an enterprise solely for domes-
tic sales and gives the local government the responsibility for imbalances in foreign
exchange. In practice this type of deal has proven all but impossible to negotiate be-
cause it is "a matter of policy decided at the national level .... It is the most common
example of the law going further than present policy allows." Bangsberg, Progress to
Date in Chinese Investment Laws, INT'L. FiN. L. REv., Feb. 1986, at 37-38 (quoting a
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Despite the fact that the JV Regulations and the EFI Regulations
permit, albeit discourage, a joint venture to acquire its inputs from
abroad, which would apparently eliminate the aforementioned Chinese
sourcing difficulties, this legislative concession is rendered largely illu-
sory by the fact that joint ventures typically lack sufficient foreign ex-
change with which to make such purchases. 151 Article 14 of the EFI
Regulations, as well as the Regulations of the State Council concerning
the Balance of Foreign Income and Expenditure of Sino-foreign Joint
Equity Exchange Ventures (FEB Regulations)," 2 are intended to alle-
viate the foreign exchange crisis for many joint ventures. These provi-
sions are seriously flawed in several respects, however, and thus their
effectiveness is doubtful.1 5' Because it is unlikely that foreign sourcing
will become significantly easier for joint ventures in the near future,
foreign investors will likely have no alternative but to continue to rely
on the generally high priced, inferior quality, and sporadically supplied
Chinese inputs.
Access to the vast Chinese domestic market has always been a lure
to potential foreign investors. In contrast, the Chinese government has
always sought to increase exports in an effort to earn foreign exchange
and become integrated in the international marketplace.1 54 The initial
resolution of these conflicting interests, the JV Law, completely accom-
modated Chinese goals, and it failed to mention, much less make acces-
sible to joint ventures, the Chinese consumer market.155 In the JV Reg-
lawyer involved in negotiations of joint ventures in China).
' See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 560; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 18. See also
Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 330. For example, when A.M.C.'s foreign exchange ac-
count became depleted and the Chinese government refused to replenish it with con-
verted renminbi, A.M.C. was unable to continue importing the Jeep kits necessary for
production, and thus production stopped. See Burns, supra note 139.
In addition, any imported equipment or materials which are not investment capital
are subject to industrial and commercial taxes and import duties, unless China cannot
guarantee their domestic production and supply. JV Regulations, supra note 10, art.
71(3). For example, the Jeep kits which A.M.C. imports are subject to an import duty
of between 50 and 70 percent. See Burns, supra note 139, at D4, col. 3. This further
escalates the costs of imported materials, and makes export of the finished product even
more difficult. Id.
... Regulations of the State Council concerning the Balance of Foreign Exchange
Income and Expenditure by Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Ventures, promulgated by the
State Council, Jan. 15, 1986, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 8,031
[hereinafter FEB Regulations].
153 See infra notes 211-40 and accompanying text.
'" As one Chinese commentator stated, "Foreigners want domestic sales; the Chi-
nese side wants international sales. This creates a contradiction." See C. BAOTAI,
ZHONGWAI HEZIJINGYING QIYEFA JI QI SHISHI JINGYAN QIANTAN 107 (1983),
cited in Fenwick, supra note 5, at 855 n.60. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note
3, at 166; Schiffman, supra note 14, at 12, col. 1.
'" See Golden, supra note 7, at 408.
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ulations foreign investors gained legislative concessions, however, and
now joint ventures can sell their products domestically if the product is
presently imported or "urgently" needed by. the PRC. 1 8 Nevertheless,
joint ventures are still encouraged to sell their products on the interna-
tional market.
157
Although the JV Regulations have legally opened the Chinese do-
mestic market to foreign joint venture investors, many problems re-
main. First, on a practical level, the standard of living of the average
Chinese consumer is relatively low, and thus China's buying power is
limited.' 51 Second, it remains unclear how the urgency of a product
needed in the PRC is determined, thus leaving MOFERT to make a
determination that is arbitrary and potentially detrimental to foreign
interests. Moreover, it is not clear what happens if a product which
was once determined to be urgently needed loses this status.1' Third,
the joint venture which hopes to sell its products on the domestic mar-
ket must contend with China's relatively undeveloped transportation
system. The producer can never be confident that the goods will arrive
at the market at a specified time, or even that they will arrive at all.'60
Fourth, any goods sold by the joint venture on the domestic market
must be integrated in the state-planned economy.' The joint venture
is thereby subjected to the infamous bureaucratic inefficiencies of the
Chinese distributional system.'6" Fifth, any joint venture-produced good
to be sold on the domestic market will have its selling price determined
by the Chinese government, with few exceptions.' 63 This problem is
particularly troubling to foreign investors since the permitted profit
margin on a particular product is established according to the perceived
quality of the product. If, for some reason, the product is deemed "in-
ferior" by the Chinese authorities, its selling price can be set below its
cost.' 64 Finally, sales on the domestic market typically yield only
158 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 61. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at
561; Moser, supra note 5, at 130; Swindler, supra note 3, at 1031.
157 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 60. See Moser, supra note 5, at 130.
158 Kraar, supra note 13, at 86.
159 See Golden, supra note 7, at 410.
"80 See Japanese Investment in China, supra note 139, at 3. See also Swindler,
supra note 3, at 1042.
... JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 64. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39,
at 561; Moser, supra note 5, at 130-31; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 18.
162 See After the Contract, supra note 130, at 4; Alford & Birenbaum, supra note
4, at 82-83.
163 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 66. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39,
at 561; Moser, supra note 5, at 131.
16 See Japanese Investment in China, supra note 139, at 3. An item may be
priced at the international market rate with government approval. In that case, the joint
venture must file the price it sets with the appropriate departments. JV Regulations,
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renminbi earnings. 65 Despite the FEB Regulations and the EFI Regu-
lations, which are intended to facilitate the conversion of renminbi into
foreign exchange, such conversion remains exceedingly difficult. These
problems, either singly or in combination, diminish the attractiveness of
the domestic Chinese market.
4.3. Labor Management
4.3.1. Employment and Termination
The JV Law provided little guidance concerning labor manage-
ment.16 6 Matters such as the employment and discharge of workers
were left completely subject to joint venture negotiations. 67 Subse-
quently, the JV Regulations, the Regulations of the People's Republic
of China on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment (LM Regulations) adopted in July of 1980,68 and
the Provisions for the Implementation of the Regulations on Labor
Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment
adopted in January of 1984,169 provided substantive guidelines for joint
venture labor management.
The LM Regulations provide that worker employment, dismissal
and resignation, working hours, employment tasks, wages, insurance,
vacations, and discipline must be covered in the labor contract negoti-
ated between the joint venture and the labor union."' The LM Regu-
lations further provide that a joint venture may employ workers re-
cruited by the local authorities or, with the approval of the authorities,
may recruit its own workers.' In either case, the qualifications of the
supra note 10, art. 66.
165 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 66. See Kraar, supra note 13, at 88; Lus-
senburg, supra note 39, at 561.
'e See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 562.
167 See Golden, supra note 7, at 405; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 19.
188 Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Labor Management of Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by The State Council,
July 26, 1980, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 7,861 [hereinafter
LM Regulations].
189 Provisions for the Implementation of the Regulations on Labor Management
of Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, promulgated by The Labor
and Personnel Department of the People's Republic of China, Jan. 19, 1984, reprinted
and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 7,867.
170 LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 2. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at
562-63; Moser, supra note 5, at 126. Small joint ventures, however, may contract with
staff and workers on an individual basis. LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 2. See
Moser, supra note 5, at 126.
171 LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 3. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at
563; Moser, supra note 5, at 126.
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workers may be verified by the use of examinations. 72 Nevertheless, in
practice most joint ventures have been forced to accept workers nomi-
nated by the Chinese partner without any formal examination pro-
cess.'17 Therefore, the foreign investor may find that the LM Regula-
tions provide little support with which to influence the hiring of
workers.
Regarding the termination of workers, the foreign investor is
equally encumbered. Although the LM Regulations state that "surplus
workers and staff members as a result of changes in production and
technical conditions of the joint venture .. .who fail to meet the re-
quirements after training and are not suitable for other work can be
discharged,"'1 74 these provisions are virtually worthless because of the
numerous protections afforded Chinese workers in other provisions.17 5
In general, if the Chinese partner does not agree to the termination, the
foreign investor may find the dismissal of a joint venture employee, for
all intents and purposes, to be impossible.'
Regarding management employees, the JV Regulations provide
that joint venture officers may be dismissed for "graft or serious dere-
liction of duty."''1 7 It may be inferred that any act or omission which
falls short of this high standard, such as a negligent or incompetent act
or omission, is not of sufficient gravity to justify dismissal.
Article 15 of the EFI Regulations purports to give complete auton-
omy to joint ventures regarding the employment and termination of
workers and management personnel.1 7' The joint venture need only file
"[d]etails of recruitment, discharge and dismissal of employees" with
172 LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 3. See Moser, supra note 5, at 563.
173 Moser, supra note 5, at 126. In addition to discovering that it has little influ-
ence over the quality of the workers hired, the foreign investor will also likely find that
the quantity of workers hired is beyond its control. See Gelatt, supra note 28, at 239.
174 LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 4. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at
563; Moser, supra note 5, at 126-27.
175 LM Regulations, supra note 168, arts. 5, 6, 14. For example, any dismissal
must be reported to the local labor bureau for approval, after which the joint venture's
labor union can file an objection to the dismissal with the board of directors. If the
dispute cannot be resolved through consultation, the dismissed employees may request
arbitration before the labor bureau. If either party disagrees with the arbitration rul-
ing, a suit may be brought in Chinese court. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 563-64;
Moser, supra note 5, at 127.
17" See Moser, supra note 5, at 127; See also Incoming Telegram 1, supra note
11, at 2; Bennett, Peking Announces Detailed Regulations Concerning Foreign-Chi-
nese Joint Ventures, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1983, at 41, col. 2 ("[A]lthough joint ven-
tures nominally have the right to hire and fire, many said that in practice the ventures
have no authority. 'You can't hire and fire on your own no matter what they say ...
17JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 41. See Swindler, supra note 3, at 1035
n.197.
178 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 15. See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 115.
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the local labor and personnel authorities.' 79 In a country where Mao's
"iron rice bowl" remains a fundamental principle,18 ° however, policies
designed to approximate free market labor practices will likely prove
impossible.18'
4.3.2. Employee Remuneration
The legislative and cultural barriers to the termination of employ-
ees is a serious problem for the foreign joint venture investor, particu-
larly given the generally recognized inferior productivity of Chinese
workers when judged by international standards.'82 Low worker pro-
ductivity might be acceptable if the labor cost were sufficiently low rel-
ative to other countries. The LM Regulations, however, provide for
wage levels of joint venture workers to be set at "120 to 150% of the
real wages of the workers and staff members of state-owned enterprises
of the same trade in the locality."'83 The EFI Regulations, which in
'l EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 15. The EFI Regulations conflict with
the older JV Regulations. Further experience is needed to see how the two sets of rules
work together. See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 115-17.
"ao Mao Zedong's "iron rice bowl" was a policy whereby all citizens enjoyed a job
and, unfortunately, an equally poor standard of living. Although this policy has been
criticized since Mao's death, it is only in the last year that the concept of taking care of
everyone from birth to death, which is deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition of the
workplace, has been seriously threatened. See Smashing the Bowl, ECONOMIST, Sept.
25, 1987, at 43 [hereinafter Smashing the Bowl]. See also Alford & Birenbaum, supra
note 4, at 86 n.278.
181 Riots broke out during the Summer of 1986 over China's new bankruptcy law
which also promised to bring job dislocation. This precedent does not bode well for the
Chinese government's capacity to impose new reforms. Smashing the Bowl, supra note
180, at 44. This kind of reform-engendered political turbulence is extremely troubling
to existing joint ventures and a severe deterrent to potential joint venture investors as it
indicates political instability and the possible reversal of positive reforms. Cohen &
Valentine, supra note 3, at 187-88.
... According to a U.S. engineer in China:
It's an unsafe work environment. There's junk all over, and so many peo-
ple, most of them sitting down watching. All of the basic construction is
pretty low level. The people are doing a pretty good job, but they had to
be taught everything to our standards. And it's difficult to get them to
maintain it.
After the Contract, supra note 130, at 4. See Bums, supra note 139, at D4, col. 4
(workers that are touted by the Chinese government as being among "Peking's best"
require an average of 88 man-hours for each completed Jeep, compared with 32 man-
hours in A.M.C.'s Toledo factory) (the article includes a photograph of a Chinese as-
sembly line worker taking a nap while Jeeps roll past him); Burns, supra note 63, at
F7, cols. 5-6 (productivity rates are so low that it is more expensive to produce goods in
China than in the United States or Western Europe).
183 LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 8. See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 331
(the basis from which the 120-150% increase is calculated is often settled by contract);
Hsia & Haun, supra note 40, at 70; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 564; Moser, supra
note 5, at 127.
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article 15 purport to grant autonomy to joint ventures in the determina-
tion of wages, offer no relief because their implementing provisions, the
Autonomy Regulations, establish a joint venture wage floor at 120 per-
cent of the average wage of workers in state-owned enterprises in the
same locality.'" In addition, joint ventures are required to provide ben-
efits such as labor insurance, medical expenses, and other subsidies that
are given to workers in state-owned enterprises.'8 Although the EFI
Regulations exempt export enterprises and technologically advanced
enterprises from payment of state subsidies to staff," 6 all joint ventures
must continue to pay labor insurance, welfare benefits, and housing
subsidies for Chinese workers.' It has been estimated that because of
these subsidies, a joint venture worker's total remuneration is two to
three times the amount of the worker's basic wage.' 88 This being the
case, China may have priced itself out of the market relative to other
developing Asian country labor rates.' 9
18 Autonomy Regulations, supra note 16, art. 2(i). Furthermore, to the extent
that the Autonomy Regulations remove the wage ceiling provided by prior legislation,
set at 150% of state-owned enterprise wages, they create the possibility of higher labor
costs. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 197.
18" LM Regulations, supra note 168, art. 11. See Hsia & Haun, supra note 40,
at 70; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 564; Moser, supra note 5, at 127.
188 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 3. State subsidies include subsidies for
heat, cooking coal, grain allowance, and other staples. See Yuqing, supra note 13, at
109 n.192.
187 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 3. See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 117.
18 See Moser, supra note 5, at 127. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at
196 n.126 ("[t]ypically, an unskilled employer of a [joint venture] will receive a take-
home pay of approximately $40 per month . . . , while the direct cost to the [joint
venture] (including subsidies) will be approximately $140."). Foreign investors often
find it difficult to obtain a detailed accounting of the composition and use of these
employee subsidies. See Gelatt, supra note 28, at 240.
18 For example, it is estimated that the wages paid joint venture workers in
China's Special Economic Zones are approximately 30% lower than wages paid in
Hong Kong. The productivity rate of workers in China, however, is estimated to be
50% lower than that of workers in Hong Kong. Therefore, the overall labor costs will
be higher in China than in Hong Kong. See Huan, supra note 106, at 16. Another
author makes a similar observation:
[T]he Chinese government has not made its labor supply significantly
more attractive to foreign investors than the labor forces of other develop-
ing countries competing for the same industrial investment. China is only
one of the nations offering inexpensive labor as an incentive for invest-
ment. When compared with some South American, African, and other
Asian nations, the Chinese labor pool suffers from a serious language bar-
rier, cultural unfamiliarity, differing professional standards, and a vast
lack of contact with the Western world.
Golden, supra note 7, at 406-07. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 196
("Labor productivity in the PRC lags behind that of places such as Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, Singapore and South Korea because ventures are often pressed to hire more staff
than they need, they are burdened by excessive charges and subsidies, and workers lack
incentives to perform efficiently.").
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A final issue relevant to labor matters concerns the equality of pay
principle between Chinese and foreign employees. Chinese negotiators
have consistently insisted, based on the principle of equality, that Chi-
nese employees receive the same compensation as their foreign counter-
parts.190 In contrast, foreign investors assert that, for several reasons,
equality of compensation, although an acceptable principle in theory, is
wholly inappropriate in the context of a Sino-foreign joint venture.
First, equality of pay ignores the radically different economic and socie-
tal contexts of the foreign and Chinese managers. Foreign managers are
paid by the company according to prevailing labor market conditions,
and paid a premium to work in a distant, developing country such as
China, but Chinese managers are paid according to non-market, gov-
ernment-established wage guidelines, and are not required to leave
their homeland.19 Second, Chinese managers typically lack the skill
and experience of their foreign counterparts, and thus will be incapable
of truly performing equal work. 92 This fact is implicitly acknowledged
by China's open door policy, whose purpose is to import managerial
knowledge and expertise. 9 Third, the Chinese manager does not per-
sonally benefit from equal pay, because the overwhelming majority of
the salary must be given to the Chinese partner or the Chinese govern-
ment.'" Finally, the principle of equal pay is nowhere mandated in
current legislation, and in fact runs counter to the spirit of the law. 93
Some compromises have been negotiated concerning this issue, but usu-
ally they are not considered satisfactory from the foreign investor's
perspective.1 96
5. FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS
5.1. Balancing of Foreign Exchange Accounts
The JV Law delegated foreign exchange issues in general, and the
repatriation of joint venture profits in particular, to foreign exchange
190 This principle is known as tonggong tongchou, or "equal pay for equal work."
See Gelatt, supra note 28, at 240. See also Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 331; Lus-
senburg, supra note 39, at 565; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 19.
191 See Cohen & Harris, Equal Pay for Equal Work, CHINA Bus. REv., Jan.-
Feb., 1986, at 10.
192 Id. at 10-11. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 196.
193 Cohen & Harris, supra note 191, at 10-11.
'u Id. at 11. See also Cohen, Equity Joint Ventures, CHINA Bus. REv., Nov.-
Dec., 1982, at 24; Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 196.
195 Cohen & Harris, supra note 191, at 11. Instead of being a legal principle, the
equality of pay principle "reflects the political undesirability of a foreign manager
earning an amount far in excess of his Chinese counterpart's salary." See Gelatt, supra
note 28, at 241.
198 See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 565 n.93.
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regulations which, in 1979, were yet to be created.197 When on Decem-
ber 18, 1980, the State Council promulgated the Provisional Regula-
tions for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Republic of China
(FEC Regulations),19 any hopes in the foreign investment community
for a favorable foreign exchange law were dashed. Most devastating
from the foreign joint venture investor's perspective was the FEC Reg-
ulations' requirement that joint ventures deposit all foreign exchange
receipts with the Bank of China, or a bank approved by the Bank of
China, and then make all foreign exchange disbursements from their
foreign exchange deposit accounts.199 Because Chinese renminbi is not
convertible into foreign exchange, these provisions effectively limit a
joint venture's foreign exchange disbursements to its foreign exchange
earnings from exports. Such a stringent limitation was disastrous for
newly established joint ventures which typically try to import almost all
production inputs and materials due to Chinese sourcing inadequa-
cies,200 and which find it difficult, if not impossible, to export finished
products due to their inferior quality.2"' For these joint ventures,
chronic foreign exchange imbalances, and all of their undesirable conse-
quences, were the inevitable result.2"2 Any joint venture that was fortu-
nate enough to be able to manufacture exportable products was com-
pelled to do so, and abandon the domestic market sales that often was a
motivating factor behind the foreign investment.203
Several of these difficulties were apparently solved with the advent
of the Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regulations
Relating to Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises
with Foreign Capital and Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Ventures (FEC
Rules). 2"' For instance, article 12 of the FEC Rules provides that for-
eign exchange can be used as the currency of settlement between joint
ventures and Chinese domestic enterprises in four cases, namely (1)
197 JV Law, supra note 3, arts. 8, 10.
199 Provisional Regulations for Foreign Exchange Control of the People's Repub-
lic of China, adopted by The Regular Session of the State Council, Dec. 5, 1980,
promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 18, 1980, reprinted and translated in CHINA
L. FOR. Bus., 10,353 [hereinafter FEC Regulations].
199 Id. art. 22. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 572-74; Moser, supra note
5, at 131; Nee 1, supra note 1, at 21-22.
200 Yuqing, supra note 13, at 100.
201 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 188.
.2 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 188; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 100.
203 Moser, supra note 5, at 131-32.
204 Rules for the Implementation of Exchange Control Regulations Relating to
Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with Foreign Capital and
Sino-foreign Joint Equity Ventures, approved by The State Council, July 19, 1983,
promulgated by The State Administration of Exchange Control, (SAEC) Aug. 1, 1983,
reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 10,483 [hereinafter FEC Rules].
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where the products manufactured by the joint venture are import sub-
stitutes and the purchaser is a Chinese unit actively involved with for-
eign trade, (2) where products are purchased for the production of
goods that would otherwise be exported or imported by a Chinese unit
actively involved with foreign trade, (3) where a Chinese entity has
completed construction work for the joint venture, and (4) where ap-
proval has been given by SAEC.2 °5 These provisions make it possible,
at least in theory, for a joint venture to both sell its products on the
domestic Chinese market and to earn foreign exchange through those
sales.
This policy of permitting joint ventures which sell their products
on the domestic market to earn foreign exchange is similarly promoted
by the JV Regulations. Article 75 of the JV Regulations provides that
if a joint venture which sells domestically experiences a foreign ex-
change imbalance, the deficit would be righted by the PRO itself, either
at the local or the national level.20 6 This provision has been interpreted
to mean that joint ventures selling their products principally within
China can have their renminbi earnings converted into foreign ex-
change at the favorable internal conversion rate if this was approved by
the authorities at the feasibility study and contract negotiation stages.207
In practice, however, article 12 of the FEC Rules and article 75 of
the JV Regulations have been a disappointment to foreign investors.
For instance, if a joint venture desires to take advantage of either article
12 or article 75 provisions, approval must be received from the Chinese
authorities, either at the local or the national level.208 Before 1985, ap-
proval was extremely difficult to obtain, and only joint ventures which
undertook high priority projects or produced goods that the Chinese
urgently needed or imported received article 12 or article 75 ap-
proval.209 After 1985, approval was virtually impossible to obtain, as
China's foreign exchange reserves had dwindled and pressure was put
20. Id. art. 12. See also Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 573-74; Moser, supra note
5, at 132. Notwithstanding these provisions, experience has shown that "most joint
ventures have yet to show a profit in anything other than the inconvertible Chinese
currency, the renminbi ... For many, the best that can be expected is an accumulating
surplus of renminbi, whose value is questionable." Burns, supra note 63, at F7, cols. 1-
3.
206 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 75. See also Fenwick, supra note 5, at
859; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 574 n.127; Moser, supra note 5, at 132.
207 See Randt, New Joint Venture Implementing Regulations - A Step Forward, 5
E. ASIAN EXEC. REP., Nov., 1983, at 9. When the Chinese government's foreign ex-
change reserves are depleted, however, as they are presently, it is unlikely that the
government will permit joint ventures to take advantage of these provisions which will
only further deplete their reserves. See generally Burns, supra note 63, at F7, col. 1.
20. FEC Rules, supra note 204, art. 12; JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 75.
209 See Bloomfield, supra note 64, at 330.
[Vol. 10:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss2/5
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
upon joint ventures to become self-sufficient in their foreign exchange
requirements. 10 Therefore, foreign investors cannot depend on article
12 or article 75 to remedy their foreign exchange dilemma.
In 1986, the Chinese government promulgated the FEB Regula-
tions in an effort to solve the foreign exchange crisis.2 ' As is the case
with much of China's joint venture legislation, however, it too is flawed
and will probably not significantly encourage foreign investors. First,
article 3 of the FEB Regulations provides that a joint venture which
experiences a foreign exchange deficit can have that deficit "adjusted"
by the voluntarily converted surplus foreign exchange of other joint
ventures.2"2 Such adjustment is to be made through a fund administered
by either the central or the local authorities.213 This provision is prob-
lematic inasmuch as it can function only when there are many joint
ventures in China that are willing to convert their excess foreign ex-
change to renminbi.2" 4 Currently, there are very few joint ventures that
have a foreign exchange surplus, and even fewer that are willing to
convert it to renminbi.2"5 It is therefore improbable that the authorities
will have anything in the fund with which to make the adjustment. 1 '
210 See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 189; Gelatt, The Foreign Exchange
Quandary, 13 CHINA Bus. REV., May-June, 1986, at 20; Gelatt, supra note 28, at
242.
21 See supra note 152.
212 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 3. See also Gelatt, supra note 210, at
29; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 100-01.
31 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 3 (the "local People's Government or
relevant department shall be responsible for adjustment [of] the foreign exchange...
."). However, the responsibility of the government is subject to the limitation found in
article 7. When the enterprise creates the imbalance by not fulfilling the "stipulated
contractual obligations for exports and generation of foreign exchange," the government
is absolved of its responsibility of "resolving the situation through adjustment." Id. art.
7. See also Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 101.
214 See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 101 ("A shortcoming in the provision is that it
can be used only when many foreign investment enterprises in China are rich in for-
eign exchange and are willing to swap this surplus for Chinese currency.").
215 See Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29 (Gelatt views the adjustment process criti-
cally, noting that "[tihis rule seems to imply that MOFERT or other [governmental]
authorities have the right to rob Peter to pay Paul - to requisition foreign exchange
from one joint venture to make up for the deficit of another.").
216 Rather than forcing joint ventures to relinquish their foreign exchange, offi-
cials explain that "foreign exchange voluntarily converted by exchange-rich joint ven-
tures needing renminbi for local costs will be held in reserve and used to meet the needs
of deficit-ridden ventures that sell domestically." Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29. In his
article Gelatt questions the sufficiency of these reserves because, with the exception of
hotels, relatively few joint ventures "enjoy the luxury of a foreign exchange surplus
that might be converted ... into local currency." Id.
Article 3 of the FEB Regulations is similar to article 14 of the EFI Regulations
insofar as they both permit joint ventures to "adjust" their foreign exchange. Article 14
appears to be less cumbersome than article 3 to the extent that article 3 requires gov-
ernment administration of the adjustment fund, whereas article 14 permits joint yen-
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Because there is no indication of the Chinese government's willingness
to supplement the fund with foreign exchange of its own, article 3 of
the FEB Regulations is more restrictive than article 75 of the JV
Regulations.217
Second, article 4 of the FEB Regulations states that "special con-
sideration" with respect to sales on the domestic market will be given to
joint ventures that satisfy certain narrowly-defined conditions.218 These
conditions require the joint venture to manufacture products with "ad-
vanced or key technology" that are "sophisticated," "internationally
competitive," and "urgently needed" in China.2 9 An unspecified gov-
ernmental entity must inspect the products to ensure that they satisfy
these criteria.220 If the joint venture is found to have satisfied these
conditions, it can have its foreign exchange imbalance corrected by the
local or national government.221 Article 4, like article 3, reverses the
progress made in the JV Regulations. It makes the criteria for acces-
sing the Chinese market, originally established in article 61 of the JV
Regulations, much more stringent. Specifically, article 61 states only
that joint venture products must be "urgently needed" in order to be
sold "primarily" on the Chinese market. Article 4, on the other hand,
states that to obtain "special consideration" for domestic sales, the
products must not only be urgently needed, but must also possess cer-
tain other characteristics mentioned above. 22 2 While it is clear that the
decision regarding special consideration and foreign exchange correction
is to be made by the authorities at the initial joint venture approval
stage, it is not clear whether that decision can be changed to the detri-
ment of a joint venture if, at a subsequent time, the joint venture's
products are deemed to no longer satisfy article 4's stringent criteria for
tures to, under government supervision, directly "engage in mutual adjustment of their
foreign exchange surpluses and shortfalls." Nevertheless, article 14 of the EFI Regula-
tions, like article 3 of the FEB Regulations, is flawed because of the dearth of joint
ventures that actually have too much foreign exchange and too little renminbi. Id.
2 7 "If, as the [FEB Regulations] imply, excess foreign currency turned over by
joint ventures will be the only source of direct foreign exchange subsidies for deficit-
ridden ventures, then the outlook seems decidedly more bleak than it did under article
75 of the 1983 [JV Regulations]." Id.
21I FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 4. See also Gelatt, supra note 210, at
28; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 101.
219 See supra note 215.
220 See supra note 215.
221 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 4. See also Yuqing, supra note 13, at
102.
222 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 61; FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art.
4. See supra text accompanying note 219. See also Gelatt, supra note 210, at 28-29
(noting that the 1983 JV Regulations have been narrowed by the FEB Regulations to
include "high technology and superior quality, internationally competitive products.").
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product quality.22 Finally, because the value of article 4 is dependent
upon the adequacy of the Chinese government's foreign exchange
reserves, it will become worthless if those reserves are depleted.224
Article 5 of the FEB Regulations states that joint ventures may
sell their products, for foreign exchange, as import substitutes to Chi-
nese "end-users."22 The products must be ones which "China needs to
import on a long-term or urgent basis," and must, "depending on re-
quirements as to quality and specifications and the import situation,"
be approved by the relevant authorities. 226 Despite the fact that article
5 provides that governmental authorities shall "actively support domes-
tic end-users" in making these purchases from joint ventures at "inter-
national prices," this provision is faulty in two respects. First, there
remains the problem that foreign exchange in China is scarce, and Chi-
nese customers simply may not possess the requisite amount of foreign
exchange to make the purchase.2 Second, Chinese customers exhibit a
strong preference for imported goods due to their perceived superiority,
and thus the joint venture may be unable to find Chinese customers
willing to purchase domestically produced goods for foreign ex-
223 Gelatt recognizes this problem by stating that:
[s]ince decisions on special foreign exchange dispensation must be made at
the feasibility study stage - before the joint venture has been established -
the [FEB Regulations] imply that the foreign investor's products will be
the ones appraised. What is not clear is whether an additional appraisal of
the joint venture's products will follow once the venture begins production.
If so, could a joint venture whose own products fail the test that the for-
eign investor's products passed have its benefits revoked?
Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29.
224 "Article 4 is likely to be confined by China's limited foreign exchange reserves.
Thus, during the next few years, China may not be in a position to offer this treatment
to a large number of joint ventures." Yuqing, supra note 13, at 102.
'" FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 5. See also Gelatt, supra note 210, at
29 (Gelatt points out that "instead of explicitly stating that joint ventures producing
import substitutes may sell them for foreign exchange to Chinese customers, the [FEB
Regulations] merely state that economic relations and trade departments should 'ac-
tively support' Chinese units wishing to buy import substitution products 'according to
international prices.' "); Yuqing, supra note 13, at 102.
22' To a certain extent, article 5 reiterates article 64 of the JV Regulations, which
allows joint ventures to sell items needed for import to Chinese foreign trade companies
for foreign currency. JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 64(4). The major difference is
that article 5 allows sales to any "Chinese end-users" not just "Chinese trade corpora-
tions." See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 102.
Article 8 of the FEB Regulations enables joint ventures not engaged in import
substitution to sell their products to Chinese enterprises for foreign currency with the
approval of the state foreign exchange administration. Article 8 only applies to enter-
prises selling products outside of the special economic zones and technological develop-
ment zones of the 14 open coastal cities, implying that permission is not needed for
sales within such zones. MOFERT has not published any regulations interpreting this
provision however. See Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29.
227 Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29.
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change. 28 Article 6 of the FEB Regulations provides an opportunity
for countertrade. According to article 6, joint ventures that have a for-
eign exchange imbalance would be permitted, with government ap-
proval, to purchase export-quality Chinese goods for renminbi, and
then sell those goods for foreign exchange on the international mar-
ket.22 This provision is, however, also unworkable in practice because
any Chinese entity that is capable of earning foreign exchange through
exports is usually unwilling to sell its products domestically for
renminbi.30 In addition, permission from the government to export
Chinese-produced goods is extremely difficult to obtain because the
Chinese foreign trade corporations, which seek to monopolize the ex-
port market, possess great political power.231
Article 9 of the FEB Regulations permits a foreign investor with
two or more joint ventures in China to pool their foreign exchange so
that the foreign exchange deficit of one joint venture may be offset by
the foreign exchange surplus of another.2"2 This adjustment may only
be made, however, with the approval of the government and all the
joint venture parties.2" Because it is improbable that a Chinese party
to a joint venture with a foreign exchange surplus would consent to
such an exchange with an unrelated joint venture, the value of article 9
is questionable.2' Also, because so few joint ventures presently are for-
tunate enough to have a foreign exchange surplus, the provision will
rarely be applicable.2 5
"22 Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29; Kraar, supra note 13, at 89; Yuqing, supra
note 13, at 102. The IS Measures, supra note 16, and the MEIS Measures, supra note
16, clarify the opportunities for import substitution, but fail to expand the opportuni-
ties granted by article 12 of the FEC Rules, article 75 of the JV Regulations, and
article 5 of the FEB Regulations. The basic flaw of the new measures is, once again,
their failure to provide sufficient incentive to Chinese consumers to buy domestically-
produced joint venture products for foreign exchange. Cohen & Valentine, supra note
3, at 192-93.
2 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 6; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 103.
110 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 190; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30. Al-
though the PDP Measures, supra note 16, clarify the opportunities for countertrade
available to joint ventures, they do little to remedy the basic problem of firms' refusal to
sell exportable products to joint ventures for renminbi. Cohen & Valentine, supra note
3, at 191-92.
231 Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 105.
222 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 9; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 105.
233 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 9; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 105-06.
234 Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 190; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30.
235 See'Gelatt, supra note 210, at 29. Article 14 of the EFI Regulations increases
the possibility for joint ventures to pool their foreign exchange earnings insofar as it
eliminates the requirement found in article 9 of the FEB Regulations that the joint
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Finally, article 10 of the FEB Regulations permits joint ventures
to reinvest, with government approval, their renminbi earnings in other
domestic enterprises capable of earning foreign exchange.286 Such rein-
vestment would also qualify for a 40% income tax refund,2"' or a full
refund if the reinvestment is made in an export enterprise or a techno-
logically advanced enterprise.2"8 This provision is problematic, how-
ever, because domestic enterprises are less interested in renminbi invest-
ments than in investment in the form of foreign exchange or foreign
technology. It is therefore unlikely that the joint venture in need of
foreign exchange will find another enterprise willing to part with its
foreign exchange earnings for a renminbi investment.23 9
The FEB Regulations provide a legal basis for joint ventures with
foreign exchange imbalances to obtain relief. Because, however, the re-
lief is to come from government entities, Chinese trade corporations, or
other Sino-foreign joint ventures, which are themselves typically in
need of foreign exchange, the practical application of these provisions is
suspect. It is probable that any attempt to get these other entities within
China to share their scarce foreign exchange with a joint venture
through the FEB Regulations will amount to little more than an at-
tempt to get blood from the proverbial stone.240
5.2. Repatriation of Profits and Wages
As the previous section makes clear, joint ventures in China are
faced with a foreign exchange crisis that is not mitigated by existing
legislation. This foreign exchange crisis makes it difficult, if not impos-
sible, for many joint ventures to pay their foreign personnel, and remit
their profits, in foreign exchange. Even when a joint venture is fortu-
nate enough to have a positive foreign exchange balance, however, cur-
rent legislation limits the repatriation of foreign exchange in the form
of profits and wages.
ventures be related. Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 190-91. Article 14 of the EFI
Regulations will, however, likely be of limited effectiveness given the fact that there are
presently very few joint ventures with too much foreign exchange and too little
renminbi. Id. at 191.
ass FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 10; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 106.
237 FEB Regulations, supra note 152, art. 10; Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 106. See also JVIT Law, infra note 250, art. 6.
I.P EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 10. If the project does not continue for
five years, however, the income tax refund must be repaid. Id.
"9 Gelatt, supra note 210, at 30; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 106.
240 As one commentator has said, "[f]oreign investors should accept the fact that,
unless their project is of extraordinary national importance, no form of assurance of
foreign exchange availability is likely to be forthcoming." Gelatt, supra note 28, at 243.
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The legislation governing the repatriation of wages in foreign ex-
change is confused and conflicting. Article 25 of the FEC Regulations
expressly stipulated that only 50% of a foreign employee's after-tax
wages could be remitted abroad. 41 This limitation created many diffi-
culties for the joint venture attempting to attract high caliber foreign
personnel, and made meticulous salary planning a necessity.242 One so-
lution to this problem was to pay part of the foreign employee's salary
outside of China. This proved to be an unsatisfactory solution, how-
ever, because in practice it was the .foreign investor who was forced to
bear the total cost of such payments.243
Subsequent to the FEC Regulations, both the JV Regulations and
the FEC Rules seem to liberalize the former 50% repatriation ceiling.
According to the JV Regulations, foreign employees may apply to the
Bank of China for permission to remit abroad 100% of their after-tax
earnings. 244 The FEC Rules state that a foreign employee must receive
permission from SAEC before amounts exceeding 50% of after-tax
earnings may be repatriated.2 45 Given these two rules, it remains un-
clear whether foreign personnel must apply to both the Bank of China
and SAEC for approval. In addition, the criteria for approval of such
applications remains unknown, and thus the prospect of arbitrary rejec-
tion arises, despite the statement of Chinese authorities that "all rea-
sonable applications" will be granted.248 Such a harmful prospect
would obviously increase as China's foreign exchange reserves declined.
The foreign joint venture investor may remit abroad its propor-
tionate share of the enterprise's after-tax profit by debiting the joint
venture's foreign exchange deposit account. Such debits can only be
made, however, pursuant to an application to SAEC, and approval by
the Bank of China.241 Because the legislative language governing joint
venture profit repatriation is permissive, it is uncertain whether ap-
proval of repatriation would be withheld during periods of severe for-
eign exchange shortage within the PRC.248
Finally, the advent of the Detailed Implementation Regulations
Governing Violation of Exchange Control of the People's Republic of
241 FEC Regulations, supra note 197, art. 25; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 94.
242 See Cohen, supra note 194, at 24; Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 573.
242 See Cohen, supra note 194, at 24.
244 JV Regulations, supra note 10, art. 79. See Fenwick, supra note 5, at 859;
Swindler, supra note 3, at 1036; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 94.
2'" FEC Rules, supra note 204, art. 15. See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 573;
Yuqing, supra note 13, at 94.
248 See Cohen, supra note 194, at 24; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 94.
247 See FEC Regulations, supra note 198, art. 24; FEC Rules, supra note 204,
art. 13; Lussenburg supra note 39, at 573; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 95.
248 See Lussenburg, supra note 39, at 573.
[Vol. 10:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss2/5
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
China, promulgated March 25, 1985, makes it imperative that the for-
eign investor follow the FEC Regulations, because they establish sub-
stantial penalties for evasion of the FEC Regulations.249
6. JoINT VENTURE TAXATION
6.1. Taxation of the Joint Venture Enterprise
The primary statute that governs the taxation of joint ventures in
the PRC is the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China
Concerning Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment
(JVIT Law).25 The JVIT Law defines the taxable income of a joint
venture as the annual net income of the enterprise derived from pro-
duction, business, and other sources.2 5 ' The JVIT Law establishes an
income tax rate of 33% on the joint venture's net income, comprised of
a 30% national tax and a 10% local surtax of the assessed income
tax.2152 In addition, there is a 10% income tax levied on any profits
2" Detailed Implementation Regulations Governing Violation of Exchange Con-
trol of the People's Republic of China, approved by The State Council, March 25,
1985, promulgated by SAEC, April 5, 1985, reprinted and translated in CHINA L.
FOR. Bus. 10,521. These regulations create three classes of offenses, as well as penal-
ties corresponding to each class. For example, article 2 lists six cases that are regarded
as "unlawful acquisition of foreign exchange (arbitrage)," to which the penalties de-
scribed in article 3 apply. Article 4 contains four cases of "evasion of exchange control,"
to which the penalties of article 5 apply. Article 6 enumerates four cases considered as
"disrupting financial stability," to which the penalties of article 7 apply. In addition,
the offenses listed in articles 2, 4, and 6 are not exclusive, as article 8 permits penalties
to be imposed for offenses not contained in articles 2, 4, or 6. Finally, article 9 is the
"carrot and the stick" provision: "[T]hose guilty of minor offen[s]es or offenders who
voluntarily confess to their unlawful activities to the SAEC, show sincere repentence
and demonstrate meritorious conduct by informing against other offenders, shall be
dealt with leniently or be exempt from punishment." However, "[o]ffenders who refuse
to confess, who try to cover up their offenses or refuse to mend their ways despite
repeated admonitions, shall be punished severely" according to articles 3, 5, and 7. Id.
250 The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint
Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted and promulgated by The
Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Sept. 10, 1980, reprinted and
translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 41,551 [hereinafter JVIT Law].
The JVIT Law is refined by the Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Imple-
mentation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint
Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, approved by The State Council, Dec.
10, 1980, promulgated by The Ministry of Finance, Dec. 14, 1980, reprinted and
translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 41,603 [hereinafter JVIT Regulations].
251 See JVIT Law, supra note 250, art. 1; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 89 n.105.
"Production and business" income is derived from "the production and business opera-
tions in industry, mining, communications, transportation, agriculture, forestry, animal
husbandry, fisheries, poultry farming, commerce, tourism, catering, service and other
trades." Income from "other sources" is derived from "dividends, bonuses, interest and
income from lease or transfer of property, patents, technical know-how, trademark in-
terests, copyright and other items." JVIT Regulations, supra note 250, art. 2.
252 JVIT Law, supra note 250, art. 3. See Conroy, Joint Ventures in China and
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remitted abroad by the foreign investor.253 Numerous provisions exist,
however, in the JVIT Law and the EFI Regulations to give preferen-
tial treatment to joint ventures. First, article 5 of the JVIT Law per-
mits a joint venture, with the approval of the tax authorities, to be
exempt from the income tax during its first two profitable years, and
allows a 50% reduction of the income tax payable during the next three
years.2 54 Second, article 6 of the JVIT Law permits a joint venture
which reinvests its profit in China for five years to obtain a 40% rebate
of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount, subject again to the
approval of the tax authorities.255 Finally, the JVIT Law provides, in
article 7, that any losses incurred by a joint venture in a tax year may
be carried over to the following tax year, and may be made up with a
matching amount taken from that year's income.2 5
The EFI Regulations give additional preferential tax treatment to
export enterprises and technologically advanced enterprises. First, arti-
cle 7 of the EFI Regulations exempts from the 10% income tax any
profits from such enterprises repatriated by the foreign investor.257 Sec-
ond, article 8 grants an additional 50% reduction of the income tax
payable after the expiration of the usual tax exemption and reduction
period if the export enterprise exports 70% or more of the value of its
products.2 58 Technologically advanced enterprises will, according to ar-
ticle 9, be granted a 50% reduction in the income tax rate for three
years, after the expiration of the usual income tax exemption and re-
duction period.259 Finally, joint ventures which reinvest their profits in
China for five years in an export enterprise or technologically advanced
enterprise may, upon the approval of the tax authorities, obtain a full
rebate of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount, under article
Their Tax Treatment, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Jan., 1985, at 26; Yuqing, supra note 13,
at 89.
253 JVIT Law, supra note 250, art. 4. See Conroy, supra note 252, at 27;
Stoltenberg & McClure, supra note 28, at 82; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 89.
2" JVIT Law, supra note 250, art. 5. See Conroy, supra note 252, at 26; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 90. A joint venture's first profitable year "refers to the year in
which a joint venture has begun making profit after the losses, if any, in the initial
stage of its operation have been made up in accordance with the provisions of article 7
of the [JVIT Law]." JVIT Regulations, supra note 250, art. 5.
'" JVIT Law, supra note 250, art. 6. See Conroy, supra note 252, at 27; Yuq-
ing, supra note 13, at 90.
2" JVIT Law, supra note 250, art. 7. See Yuqing, supra note 13, at 90.
257 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 7. See Stoltenberg & McClure, supra
note 28, at 83 n.112; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 110.
258 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 8. See Stoltenberg & McClure, supra
note 28, at 83 n.112; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 110.
259 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 9. See Stoltenberg & McClure, supra
note 28, at 83 n.112; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 110.
[Vol. 10:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss2/5
EQUITY JOINT VENTURES
10 of the EFI Regulations. 8 °
Despite the generally favorable tax legislation for joint ventures,
problems remain in practice. The definition of taxable income is not as
clear and unambiguous as the JVIT Law seems to suggest. Many of
the particular items to be included or excluded from taxable income are
subject to negotiation. It is therefore imperative that a precise, detailed
definition of taxable income be established during the joint venture ne-
gotiation period.261
Another tax problem commonly encountered by joint ventures con-
cerns indirect taxes. These indirect taxes often take the form of contri-
butions that must be made by the joint venture to various funds such as
welfare, bonus, reserve, labor union, recreational, or expansion funds.
The precise amount that the joint venture must contribute to such
funds is open to negotiation, so the foreign investor must be assertive in
order to avoid excessive charges. 62
A final tax problem is that many of the tax benefits can be real-
ized only with government approval. In practice, satisfactory govern-
ment approval may be difficult to obtain because many approvals are
extremely vague, or amount to little more than recommendations.263
6.2. Taxation of Foreign Joint Venture Employees
The taxation of foreign joint venture employees is, according to
article 70 of the JV Regulations, governed by the Individual Income
Tax Law of the People's Republic of China (IIT Law).'" The IIT
Law makes an individual's residence determinative of the income that
is subject to Chinese taxation. 6" Article 1 of the IIT Law states that
260 EFI Regulations, supra note 15, art. 10. See Stoltenberg & McClure, supra
note 28, at 83 n.112.
261 Conroy, supra note 252, at 29. See also Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at
205; Gelatt, supra note 28, at 244-45.
262 See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 205; Conroy, supra note 252, at 29.
263 See Cohen & Valentine, supra note 3, at 205; Conroy, supra note 252, at 29;
Gelatt, supra note 28, at 245-46.
26 Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted and
promulgated by The Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Sept. 10,
1980, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 37,751 [hereinafter IIT Law].
The IIT Law is complemented by the Detailed Rules and Regulations for the
Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China,
approved by The State Council, Dec. 10, 1980, promulgated by The Ministry of Fi-
nance, Dec. 14, 1980, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FoR. Bus. 37,853 [here-
inafter IIT Regulations]. In addition, the IIT Law is modified by the Provisional Reg-
ulations of the State Council Concerning the Reduction of Individual Income Tax on
Wages and Salaries of Foreign Nationals Working in China, promulgated by The
State Council, Aug. 8, 1987, reprinted and translated in CHINA L. FOR. Bus. 37,913
[hereinafter IIT Reduction Regulations].
265 Easson & Jinyan, Taxation of Foreign Business and Investment in the Peo-
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individuals not residing in China, or residing in China for less than one
year, are taxed only on Chinese-source income.28 6 If an individual re-
sides in China for more than one year, but less than five years, that
individual will be taxed on Chinese-source income and foreign-source
income that is remitted to China.28 7 Finally, if an individual resides in
China for more than five years, that individual must be taxed on in-
come from all sources, regardless of whether it is remitted to China.2"8
The IIT Law specifies six categories that are considered income
for tax purposes: 1)wages and salaries, 2)compensation for personal
services, 3)royalties, 4)interest, dividends, and bonuses, 5)income from
the lease of property, and 6)other items determined to be taxable by the
ministry of finance.269 Wage and salary income which exceeds a speci-
fied deduction is taxed progressively at rates from 5% to 45%.27
0 All
other categories of income are taxed at a flat rate of 20%.271 According
to the IIT Reduction Regulations, however, any income tax payable by
foreign joint venture employees under the IIT Law shall be reduced by
one half.
72
7. CONCLUSION
China has progressed very far, very fast. In less that eight years,
the Chinese government has enacted an impressive body of law gov-
erning the operations of Chinese and foreign owned joint ventures in
the PRC, and has concluded a substantial number of joint venture con-
tracts with foreign investors. Hopefully, such positive trends will con-
tinue. Nevertheless, this Comment has endeavored to expose and ana-
lyze the tremendous problems which joint ventures in China presently
face and will continue to face in the foreseeable future, in an effort to
show that, despite China's progress since 1979, the balance is tipped
decidedly against joint venture participation for the majority of
pie's Republic of China, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 666, 684 (1986). It should be
noted that under the current laws there is some ambiguity as to what constitutes "resi-
dence." Id.
266 IIT Law, supra note 264, art. 1. See Easson & Jinyan, supra note 265, at
685; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 91.
267 IIT Regulations, supra note 264, art. 3. See Easson & Jinyan, supra note
265, at 685; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 91.
268 IIT Regulations, supra note 264, art. 3. See Easson & Jinyan, supra note
265, at 685; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 91.
269 IIT Law, supra note 264, art. 2. See Easson & Jinyan, supra note 265, at
687; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 91.
270 lIT Law, supra note 264, art. 3(1). See Easson & Jinyan, supra note 265, at
688; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 91.
2I IIT Law, supra note 264, art. 3(2). See Easson & Jinyan, supra note 265, at
689-91; Yuqing, supra note 13, at 91.
172 IIT Reduction Regulations, supra note 264, art. 2(i).
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investors.
There certainly are, and will continue to be, cases in which the
foreign investor weighs the prospective advantages and disadvantages of
joint venture investment in China and concludes not only that the ad-
vantages outweigh the disadvantages, but also that the net advantage in
China is greater than that offered by other countries in which one
could invest. This, however, remains the exceptional case. As a rule,
after examining the myriad problems that continue to surround the
joint venture in China, the foreign investor will usually be better served
by alternative investment vehicles within China, or by a joint venture
investment in another country.
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